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I. INTRODUCTION 
History's most famous infertile couple resorted to a surrogate 
mother. Many years before Abraham and Sarah were blessed 
with Isaac, the natural son of their old age, the "barren" Sarah 
had said to her frustrated husband: Abraham, take my slave girl 
Hagar and through her, I, Sarah, will have a family with you.1 
Then, as now, it was not so simple. Shortly after the surrogate 
mother Hagar became pregnant (through coital means, of 
course), she began to assert her superiority over Sarah. Is it pos-
sible to anticipate, and hence, mitigate the personal and psycho-
logical rivalry between a genetic and gestational mother and an 
intended rearing mother? The understanding that Sarah had 
reached with Abraham and Hagar could not be sustained. Sarah 
mistreated Hagar and Ishmael, the son Hagar bore for Abraham, 
and eventually drove them into the wilderness. Ishmael took 
with him a formidable curse: "He shall be a man like the wild 
ass ... at odds with all his kinsmen," the Angel of the Lord 
told his mother.2 Abraham's name and property would descend 
exclusively through the biological offspring of himself and his 
wife Sarah and not through Ishmael, his bastard son. Hagar's 
compensation was God's assurance that Ishmael, although cut 
off from Abraham's lineage, would become the father of a sepa-
rate nation. 
The Biblical cast of characters found surrogacy a problematic 
course, even with the benefit of the Lord's guidance. Today's 
participants in the various scenarios for "assisting" human re-
production and creating new family relationships face their 
share of problems too, but with what guidance? Our society is 
1. Genesis, 16-17. 
2. Id. 
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uncertain about how to respond to the legal, ethical, and 
psychosocial consequences of artificial insemination, in vitro fer-
tilization, embryo storage and transfer, and hired baby-bearers. 3 
In relying on our technological capacity to separate the genetic 
from the gestational aspects of reproduction• and in paying for 
the use of a third person's sperm, ova, embryos, or womb in or-
der to produce a "child of their own," should involuntarily child-
less couples11 be left, as it were, to their own devices? 
At present, there are no federal6 or state laws7 that prohibit 
research on or the use of in vitro fertilization and embryo trans-
fers to relieve infertility. Nor do any federal or state laws di-
rectly encourage or provide funds for such research or treat-
3. Hereinafter, artificial insemination will be referred to as AID, in vitro fertilization 
as IVF, embryo transfer as ET, and hired baby-bearers as surrogate gestators or uterine 
hostesses. 
4. It is already possible for a child to have five different "parents": the woman who 
donated the egg, the man who donated the sperm, the woman to whose womb the fertil-
ized embryo is transferred so she can carry it to birth, and the man and woman who will 
receive and presumably raise the infant. Andrews, The Stork Market, 6 WHI'ITIER L. 
REV. 789, 791 (1984). 
5. The "involuntarily childless" characterization comes from Leon Kass and is in my 
view preferable to the words "infertile" or "sterile." It does not carry the potential 
stigma of "barrenness" implicit in those words and it is a broader and more accurate 
characterization of idiopathic or medically inexplicable kinds of infertility as well as of 
clinically diagnosed kinds. See Kass, "Making Babies" Revisited, 54 Pus. INTEREST 32 
(1979). I will, however, for the sak·e of economy of language, use the word infertile more 
often than "involuntarily childless" to describe the persons most likely to resort to the 
new reproductive technology. 
6. Although in 1979, the Report of the Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) to the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) concluded that, under certain circum-
stances, it would be appropriate for the federal government to support IVF research, it 
did not make any specific recommendation that the National Institute of Health (NIH) 
provide funds for such research. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ETH-
ICS ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING 
HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as EAB REP.] The EAB was terminated in 1980, and since then, neither 
HEW's successor, the Department of Health and Human Services, nor NIH has shown 
any interest in pushing for federal support for IVF or ET research. The best account of 
the political and other reasons for the persistent lack of federal involvement is 
Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 
1984, at 5. The Reagan Administration is decidedly opposed to IVF or ET research. This 
prompted the chief of pregnancy research at NIH to resign in protest of what he called 
the government's failure to fulfill its responsibilities to infertile couples and "generations 
of unborn." The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46, 53. 
7. Although many states have statutes restricting fetal research, these have generally 
been construed as not restricting IVF or ET research or procedures because they occur 
prior to implantation of a fertilized ovum in a woman's uterus and, therefore, prior to 
the creation of a fetus. A concise overview of these statutes is in Quigley & Andrews, 
Human In Vitro Fertilization and the Law, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 348 (1984). In 
contrast to the ambiguous definitions of "fetus" that are used in some of the state stat-
utes, the federal guidelines for fetal research are more precise. A fetus is defined as "the 
product of conception from the time of implantation," 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1984). 
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ment. 8 The situation with regard to surrogate gestators is more 
ambiguous. Although state laws aimed against "baby-selling" ar-
guably prohibit surrogacy contracts,9 there are also well-estab-
lished traditions of greater informality in the handling of step-
parent adoptions than of adoptions between strangers, 10 and 
courts routinely enforce, indeed encourage, private agreements 
between biological parents concerning the custody and support 
of their children.11 Therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude 
that the apparent lack of a regulatory framework means that de-
cisions about noncoital means of reproduction are being made 
"autonomously," unseen and untouched by the law. Uncertain-
ties about the legal consequences of procreative choices may un-
reasonably burden their exercise and in some instances may pre-
clude altogether the making of choices subsequently believed to 
be vital to the well-being of parents or their children.12 
This paper argues that there is an urgent need for the creation 
and clarification of a legal framework within which contempo-
rary efforts to produce or procure children can take place. State 
legislatures should act now in order to avoid the kind of crisis 
that confronts Great Britain, where an infant girl, the product of 
a breached surrogacy contract, has been impounded by a British 
8. Whatever research is currently being done to improve IVF and ET techniques, l.llld 
to learn more about their physiological consequences, is supported entirely by private 
funds, including some portion of the fees paid by patients. 
9. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1984) provides that "a person 
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in 
connection with [an adoption or a release of parental rights]"; CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) 
(Deering 1971) makes it a misdemeanor to offer any payments or anything of value to a 
parent in order to procure a consent to an adoptive placement and CAL. PENAL CoDE § 
181 (Deering 1971) makes it a felony to pay money or anything of value in order to have 
a child placed in another person's custody. Although half or more of the states have 
similar statutes, their scope is unclear and their enforcement irregular. CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 273(a) goes on to provide, for example, that it is not unlawful "to pay the maternity-
connected medical or hospital and necessary living expenses of the mother . . . as an act 
of charity, as long as the payment is not contingent upon" the completion of the adop-
tion. See generally, W. MEEzAN, S. KATZ & E.M. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES 
149-210 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MEEZAN]. 
10. Many of these statutes are cited in MEEZAN, supra note 9, at 149-210. Most states 
dispense with the requirement of a social investigation of the adoptive parent when he or 
she is the child's stepparent. 
11. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 
YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
12. For example, the absence of legal requirements to obtain and retain accurate ge-
nealogical and medical records for sperm, ova, embryo or baby-donors may make it im-
possible to disclose this information to the offspring of noncoital reproduction when they 
reach 18 even though such disclosure may, by then, be considered desirable. Such diffi-
culties are already being encountered by AID offspring who are seeking information 
about their genetic fathers. See infra text accompanying notes 202-18. 
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court. 13 While the court ponders how to determine the legal par-
entage of this particular child, Parliament considers criminal 
penalties for those who arrange surrogacy contracts and general 
regulations to constrain IVF and ET research and practice. 14 
The elements of the framework I propose derive from ·a principle 
of "supportive neutrality" similar to that set forth by David 
Chambers in a companion article in this Symposium.111 The fed-
eral and state governments should encourage the procreative ef-
forts of childless couples and remain neutral among couples 
making different choices. This neutrality implies a presumptive 
deference to voluntary private agreements and a reluctance to 
dictate their terms. 
The elements of my proposed framework also derive from a 
commitment to minimizing the risks of specific physical and 
psychological harms to the children generated by noncoital re-
production, as well as to all the other participants.16 Finally, 
these elements respond to my own belief that the opportunity to 
raise a child-the rearing aspects of parenting-hold much 
greater significance for both adults and children than do the ge-
netic or gestational links between a child and her parents. This 
is not to suggest that children raised by adults to whom they are 
not biologically related should be cut off from knowledge of, or 
even contact with, their biological kindred.17 But I would search 
for ways to make adoption both more feasible and more attrac-
13. An account of how this infant became a temporary ward of a British court is in 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1. 
14. A series of recommendations to criminalize surrogacy and to closely monitor and 
control !VF and ET in Britain are included in DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND Soc1AL SE-
CURITY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY 
(HMSO 1984) [hereinafter cited as WARNOCK REP.]. The use of noncoital methods of 
reproduction has recently caught other legal systems by surprise. In Australia, the furor 
provoked when the intended parents of a frozen embryo died without having made any 
provisions for the disposition of the embryo was so intense that the Victoria government 
asked a special commission to consider a wide range of issues posed by the technological 
capacity to freeze embryos, COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL 
ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION [WALLER COMM'N], REPORT ON THE DISPOSI-
TION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (Aug. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 
WALLER REP.]. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at Al8. In France, a court proceeding 
became necessary to determine whether a widow had a right to be inseminated with the 
frozen sperm of her deceased husband, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1984, at 20. 
15. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive 
Neutrality, 18 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 805 (1985). 
16. My framework consists of elements that are similar to those stated by Grace 
Blumberg in her discussion of donor embryo transfer: "The optimal legal response is 
precisely tailored legislation that will give due weight to process integrity, the interests of 
the child and the reasonable expectations of the parties." Blumberg, Legal Issues in 
Nonsurgical Human Ovum Transfer, 251 J.A.M.A. 1178, 1180 (1984). 
17. See discussion infra, notes 194-219 and accompanying text. 
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tive than it now is. Adoption should remain a prominent route 
by which adults can become parents and children can be assured 
of having parents. Before testing the elements of this framework 
on some of the problems presented by the new reproductive 
methods, I will say something about the nature of the present 
baby-making market, assess who stands to gain or lose by its 
operation, and indicate why any legal efforts to prohibit this 
market from operating would be unwise, whether or not 
unconstitutional. 
II. THE BABY-MAKING MARKET: IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY, 
INSISTENT PSYCHOLOGY AND INCREASING DEMAND 
Baby-making by noncoital means has become a booming busi-
ness. Since 1978, when the first live birth from IVF was achieved 
in Great Britain, 18 at least 1,000 babies have been born through-
out the world as a consequence of in vitro fertilization or embryo 
transfer techniques.19 In the United States, estimates run as 
high as 200-300 such babies. The first IVF clinic opened in this 
country at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1978 and reported its first live 
birth in December, 1981.20 As many as 150-200 such clinics may 
now be in operation around the country. About fifty of these are 
affiliated with universities or other major medical centers; the 
others are being set up as adjuncts to the private practices of 
obstetricians and gynecologists.21 Augmenting the sudden rash 
of IVF clinics are a rapidly growing number of private organiza-
tions, typically run by lawyers or lawyer-doctor teams, that are 
in the business of negotiating and arranging for the performance 
of contracts between childless couples and surrogate gestators. It 
is anyone's guess how many babies are being produced in this 
18. An announcement of the birth of Louise Brown and brief accounts of the work of 
British Doctors Steptoe and Edwards are in NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66; TIME, July 
31, 1978, at 58; N.Y. Times, July 26, 1978, at Al, col. 5. 
19. One thousand may be too high; some think it is only 500-600. Abramowitz, supra 
note 6. 
20. Jones, The Program for In Vitro Fertilization at Norfolk, 38 FERTILITY & STERIL· 
ITV 14 (1982). 
21. Kolata, In Vitro Fertilization Goes Commercial, 221 Sci. 1160 (1983). According 
to the more conservative estimates of the American Fertility Society, fewer than fifty 
IVF centers have opened. Abramowitz, supra note 6. For an account of IVF services 
being offered by two doctors who share a private practice, see Sher, Knutzen, Stratton, 
Montalhab, Allenson, Mayville, Rubenstein, Glass & Bilach, The Development of a Suc-
cessful Non-University Based Ambulatory In Vitro Fertilization/Embryo Transfer Pro-
gram: Phase I, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY, 511 (1984). 
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country through surrogacy arrangements. 22 Alongside this 
prolif era ti on of treatments and services for overcoming female 
infertility, a robust market operates for old-fashioned artificial 
insemination of the wife of a sterile man with the purchased 
sperm of an anonymous donor (AID).23 Estimates of the num-
bers of children who are born each year as a result of AID vary 
from 6,000 to 20,000.24 
For those couples who seek to benefit from the new reproduc-
tive techniques, the financial costs are high. The current market 
cost for IVF is $4,000-5,000 for each attempt at implantation in 
a woman's uterus of an eight to sixteen cell blastocyst fertilized 
in a petri dish from her surgically-removed ovum and the manu-
ally-expressed sperm of her husband or some other donor.26 If 
the initial attempt fails to result in a viable pregnancy, as is 
most likely, subsequent attempts are less expensive, particularly 
if an "excess" supply of eggs has been removed during the initial 
surgical procedure, or laparoscopy, then fertilized and frozen for 
22. The surrogate parenting organizations that have received the most. publicity are 
in Kentucky, New York, and California. No public authority has licensed any of them. 
To date, the only organization to be specifically enjoined from continuing its work is 
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. (SPA) of Kentucky. In reversing a Circuit Court 
opinion permitting SPA to arrange surrogacy contracts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
held that SPA's activities violated Kv. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2) providing that no person 
or agency not licensed by the state may accept remuneration for the procurement of any 
child for adoption. Kentucky v. SPA, Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1105 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 
1983). The New York surrogacy organization opened by Michigan attorney Noel Keane 
is described in Brozan, Surrogate Mothers: Problems and Goals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 
1984 at A17. A thriving surrogacy practice in California is described in Handel, Surro-
gate Parenting, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transplantation, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 
783 (1984). Needless to say, there is no central registry listing either the number of sur-
rogacy contracts entered into or those that have been fully performed. 
23. Artificial insemination using the sperm of a male donor has been an accepted 
medical treatment for nearly fifty years, w. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (2d ed. 
1976); Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 
465, 468 (1983). 
24. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of AID in the U.S., 300 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Curie-Cohen]. This study estimated that 
there were fewer than 10,000 AID children born annually; other estimates run as high as 
20,000. Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1984, at 1. The inadequacy of the records kept by physicians 
who perform AID is one reason for the wide disparity in estimates of precisely how many 
children are conceived each year through AID. 
25. The data in this and the following paragraphs is based on discussions with Dr. 
Emmet Lamb, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology and Director of the proposed IVF 
program at the Stanford Medical School and with Dr. Merton Bernfield, Professor of 
Pediatrics at the Stanford University Medical School (Oct. 8, 1984, Nov. 12, 1984, and 
Jan. 14, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Lamb discussions]. A good introduction to the medi-
cal technology is in Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, External Human Fertilization: An 
Evaluation of Policy, 222 Sc1. 127 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Grobstein]. More technical 
discussions appear nearly every month in the professional journal, FERTILITY & 
STERILITY. 
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later implantation.26 These estimates do not take into account 
the additional expenses incurred by such repeated efforts to 
achieve pregnancy and carry a baby to term, including travel, 
lodging, and loss of earnings. Couples typically can expect to pay 
around $12,000-15,000 for medical expenses alone for a less than 
fifty percent chance that the wife will become pregnant and an 
even lower chance that she will give birth.27 When other ex-
penses are added, the average cost for a couple who end up with 
a healthy baby can approach $40,000-50,000. The costs can be as 
high for those who end up with no child. 
Somewhat less costly than in vitro fertilization are donor em-
bryo transfers. These involve the in vivo fertilization of an ovum 
donor by artificial insemination with the intended father's 
sperm, the non-surgical removal from the donor of the fertilized 
ovum before she becomes technically pregnant,28 and the non-
surgical transfer of the donated embryo to the uterus of the in-
tended mother, who will then presumably gestate the embryo 
and carry it to term. This process is described by one of its pio-
neers as an effort to "qualify humans as the fifteenth mamma-
lian species in which embryo transfer is expected to produce 
normal young."29 To date, human embryo transfer has been 
tried in this country only at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center and 
has resulted in substantially lower rates of pregnancy and birth30 
than the comparable success rates from in vitro fertilization. 31 
26. A good overview of recent advances in the freezing of embryos and the advan-
tages of this procedure for reducing the number of surgical laparoscopies a woman must 
undergo during IVF is Coulam, Freezing Embryos, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 184 (1984). 
27. Kolata, supra note 21, at 1160. 
28. Medically, a woman is not considered pregnant until a fertilized embryo has be-
come implanted in her uterus. This does not occur until three to five days after the 
woman's ovum has been inseminated within her reproductive system. Cf. definition of 
"fetus" used in federal guidelines for fetal research, supra note 7. The embryo is re-
moved from the donor by a process called "lavage," which is literally a flushing-out, 
performed with a specially designed catheter. 
29. Interview with Dr. John Buster of Harbor-UCLA Medical Center (Feb. 21, 1985) 
[hereinafter cited as Buster interview]. See also Brotman, Human Embryo Transplants, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 6 (Magazine) at 42, 47. 
30. Bustillo, Buster, Cohen, Thorneycroft, Simon, Boyers, Marshall, Seed, Louw & 
Seed, Nonsurgical Ovum Transfer as a Treatment in Infertile Women, 251 J.A.M.A. 
1171 (Mar. 2, 1984). The physicians reported a pregnancy rate of six percent of all at-
tempts (two continuing pregnancies from 29 attempts) at in vivo fertilization by artificial 
insemination of an ovum donor. Measured as a percentage of completed embryo trans-
fers from the ovum donor to the intended uterine mother, a rate of 16% was achieved 
(two pregnancies from 12 transfers). Some commentators have questioned whether the 
procedures described by the UCLA physicians as an acceptable "treatment" for infertil-
ity should, instead, still be regarded as highly experimental. See Annas, Surrogate Em-
bryo Transfer: The Perils of Parenting, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 25. 
31. Most IVF clinics still do not report pregnancy rates of higher than 20% of all 
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For full surrogacy, in which a woman agrees to serve as ages-
tational hostess for a child whose intended rearing parents are 
the genetic father and his infertile wife, estimated costs are 
$10,000-30,000 or higher, depending on whether legal fees as well 
as payments to the baby's uterine hostess are included.32 Com-
pared to these techniques for alleviating female infertility, the 
cost for providing an infertile man an opportunity to be the legal 
parent of a child borne by his wife after she has been artificially 
inseminated with the sperm of a third party donor is only one-
tenth to one-hundredth as much. 
High financial costs in exchange for low birth rates have· not 
deterred childless couples from seeking IVF or ET treatment, 
nor from pursuing the medically simpler but legally more com-
plex surrogate gestator arrangements. Waiting lists for all these 
services are filled and, absent an unanticipated medical catastro-
phe or a systematic attempt at prohibition, the demand is likely 
to increase substantially in coming years. Americans may be ex-
periencing a veritable epidemic of infertility. An estimated ten 
to fifteen percent of all married couples are involuntarily child-
less: they fail to conceive after trying to do so for at least a year 
of not using contraceptives. 33 This represents a threefold in-
implantation attempts. Wallis, A Surrogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984 at 150. There 
are reports of pregnancy rates of 30% or higher per patient, Jones, Acosta, Andrews, 
Garcia, Seegar, Jones, Mayer, McDowell, Rozennaks, Sandon, Veek & Wilkes, Three 
Years of !VF at Norfolk, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 826 (1984). Because there are no 
federal or state reporting requirements, nor any standardized method for reporting the 
results of IVF or ET treatment, it is extremely difficult to get accurate data on just how 
many babies are being born as a percentage of implantation attempts or as a percentage 
of pregnancies. This in turn makes it extremely difficult to assess the overall costs or the 
costs per patient. There is little doubt, however, that IVF and ET pregnancy rates are 
still only about 40% that of pregnancy rates achieved through the "natural" or unas-
sisted reproductive process. See Grobstein, supra note 25. 
32. N. KEANE & D. BREo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 17 (1981); Wallis, supra note 31, 
at 53. There are no accurate assessments of the fees being paid to surrogate gestators or 
to the lawyers who arrange surrogacy contracts. Some people offer as much as $50,000 for 
surrogacy services. See, e.g., the classified advertisement for a "tall, trim, intelligent, and 
stable" surrogate aged 22-35 who, in addition to a payment of $50,000, is offered the 
assurance that her child "will be reared in an outstanding environment," N. Y. REv. OF 
BooKs, July 18, 1985, at 51. 
33. NAT'L. CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., VITAL & HEALTH STATS., SER. 23, No. 11, at 13-16, 
32 (Dec. 1982). There do not seem to be comparable statistics for unmarried women. But 
see the account of the increase in the past few years of sterility among married and 
unmarried women caused by sexually transmitted diseases. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 
72-73. New data from the National Center for Health Statistics on the widespread inci-
dence of serious impediments to conception among all women of childbearing age (15-44) 
are reported in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1985, at A12, col. 3. For an account of the 
incidence of male infertility, see Brody, Infertility: Not Uncommon Male Problem, but 
Often Treatable, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1985, at C21, col. 3. 
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crease over childlessness rates reported twenty years ago. 34 In 
more than half of the present cases, the difficulties are attributa-
ble to the women. As many as forty to fifty percent of these 
women are unable to conceive because they have blocked, dis-
eased, or otherwise damaged oviducts.35 Perhaps an additional 
ten percent are women who have had their fallopian tubes tied 
as a contraceptive measure, but who now want to become preg-
nant. 36 Surgical efforts to repair damaged oviducts or to reverse 
tubal ligations are costly, unpleasant, and only moderately suc-
cessful.37 There are, then, 500,000 to 1,000,000 married women 
who are unable to . have a child related to them, genetically or 
gestationally, without some kind of assisted fertilization or uter-
ine implantation. For women whose reproductive systems are in-
tact but who are potential transmitters of genetic diseases, IVF 
is not appropriate, but donor embryo transfer might be. 38 For 
women who have had hysterectomies, neither IVF nor ET is 
medically feasible. Resort to a surrogate gestator may be the 
only way for these women to raise a child who is genetically re-
lated to their spouses, although not to them. For couples whose 
infertility is attributable to the husband, the most efficacious 
noncoital reproductive techniques are traditional AID of the 
.wife and IVF. 
These data on the prevalence of involuntary childlessness and 
on the suitability of different methods for specific physical con-
ditions do not by themselves account for the growing demand 
for access to the baby-making market. Much of this demand fol-
lows from the social and psychological importance people attach 
to the ideal of having children who are genetically theirs. At pre-
sent, many perceive adoption as impracticable or "undesir-
able,"39 a decided second best to having genetically-related off-
spring. In our culture, the desire to reproduce through blood 
lines, to connect to future generations through one's genes, con-
tinues to exert a powerful and pervasive influence. Evidence 
34. Reproductive endocrinologist Martin Quigley, quoted in TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 
50. 
35. Bigger, In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Embryo Transfer in Humans, 
in EAB REP., supra note 6, Appendix, § 8 at 2. 
36. Sterilization is now the most popular form of contraception, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 
1985, at A12, col. 3. Research on women who later regret their original decision to be 
sterilized is summarized in Huggins & Sondheimer, Complications of Female Steriliza-
tion: Immediate and Delayed, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 337 (Mar. 1984). 
37. Lauritsen, Pagel, Vangsted, Starnp, Results of Repeated Tuboplasties, 37 FER• 
TILITY & STERILITY 68 (1982); Lamb discussions, supra note 25. 
38. Jones, Variations of a Theme, 250 J.A.M.A. 2182 (1983). 
39. "Undesirable" translates as "not enough healthy white newborns." See discussion 
infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text. 
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from other societies and from sub-cultures within America sug-
gests that this desire is not "innate" nor biologically determined, 
but is culturally constructed.•0 The cultural origins and rein-
forcement of this desire do not minimize its importance, nor the 
reality of the distress infertile men and women experience by 
being excluded from a range of fulfilling human activities associ-
ated with childbearing and childrearing.41 Women especially 
have been socialized with the view that their self-esteem, their 
deepest sense of personhood, depends on their ability to bear a 
child.42 
The development of IVF and ET and the interest in surrogate 
gestation would seem, then, to herald a new chapter in the story 
of the striving of men and women, but especially of women, to 
gain full procreative autonomy. Previous chapters in this story 
recount how the improvement of birth control techniques, the 
removal of legal restrictions on their use, and the recognition of 
a constitutional right to abortion enabled men and women to 
prevent conception, and women to terminate unwanted 
pregnancies. 43 The new chapter will detail efforts to achieve 
freedom to conceive despite what may be an unprecedented 
range of impediments. This tale contains several ironies, 
however. 
First, the dramatic increase of female infertility in recent 
years is in part the unfortunate concomitant of the hard won 
freedom to prevent conception. Pelvic inflammatory disease, 
blocked oviducts, uterine and cervical cancer, or ectopic 
pregnancies have turned out to be the devastating consequences 
for many women of certain birth control devices, including the 
Dalkon Shield and the pill.44 Second, the casual and diverse sex-
40. See, e.g., Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 539 (1983-84). 
41. A compassionate analysis of the nature of the procreative desire is in Robertson, 
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 405, 408-10 (1983). See also the discussion in WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, at ch. 2, 
§§ 2.1-2.4. 
42. An excellent overview of contemporary feminist writing, including the analyses of 
Michelle Rosaldo, Sherry Ortner and others of how women have been socialized into the 
cult of domesticity and childbearing, is H. EISENSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST 
THOUGHT (1983). See also WOMEN, CULTURE & Soc1ETY (1974). 
43. Perhaps the best accounts of nineteenth and early twentieth century efforts to 
achieve freedom from conception are L. GORDON, WoMEN's BODY, WOMEN'S RIGHT (1976); 
D. KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1970); J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978); 
and J. REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE To PuBLIC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH CoNTROL MOVEMENT AND 
AMERICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1830 (1978). 
44. Lamb discussions, supra note 25; Stevenson, Fund is Created to Settle Claims on 
Birth Devices, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 5. 
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ual relationships facilitated by the ability to control conception 
have contributed to the extraordinary increase in the incidence 
of sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Many of these cause ste-
rility if not treated in their early stages; others may not even be 
treatable. Although the frightening spread of Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) indicates that men are not being 
spared the ravages of these infections, the most severe damage 
to reproductive capacities from STDs, especially chlamydia, gon-
orrhea, and genital herpes, is being visited upon women.45 Third, 
by postponing childbearing until they have established a career 
for themselves, many women are discovering that it is more diffi-
cult to become pregnant as they approach forty and that there is 
a somewhat greater risk of giving birth to a child with Down's 
syndrome. By not having given birth when they were younger, 
they may also have made themselves more vulnerable to en-
dometriosis or to some other condition that threatens their abil-
ity to conceive.46 Having successfully separated sex from gesta-
tion, more and more people, especially women, now find that 
they cannot gestate with sex. 
Of course, the "new" impediments to conception are due to 
more than the advent of birth control or the proliferation of dif-
ferent lifestyles. Environmental pollutants and other by-prod-
ucts of our technological age have done their part to render peo-
ple infertile and to increase the risk of birth defects. Similarly, 
drugs such as diethyl stilbestrol (DES), once believed to reduce 
the risk of miscarriage for pregnant women, may have impaired 
the ability of many of these women's daughters to successfully 
bear children. 47 Hence the drive to make use of the new repro-
ductive technologies derives not simply from the fact of infertil-
ity, nor from its apparent increase, but from the social and med-
ical circumstances under which infertility has been sustained. 
The victims of infertility feel cheated: they are having to pay the 
unsuspected costs of innovations carried out on a broad scale in 
the name of several kinds of social progress. There is, then, a · 
special intensity to the conviction on the part of many childless 
persons that society owes them a child of their own.48 
45. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 72, 72-73. 
46. Lamb discussions, supra note 25. 
47. See Tilley, Assessment of Risks from DES: An Analysis of Research on Those 
Exposed During Pregnancy or In Utero, in THE CusTOM-MADE CHILD (1981). 
48. Some especially poignant versions of the view that society has a responsibility to 
provide babies to those suffering from infertility are expressed by women who are sterile 
as a consequence of their use of Dalkon Shields. Interviews by Wendy Kaufman, All 
Things Considered, Nat'l Pub. Radio (Jan. 16, 1985). 
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In the context of these feelings, a number of commentators 
argue, not surprisingly, that the interest in procreation is of such 
fundamental importance that it deserves constitutional protec-
tion. The most persuasive of these is John Robertson, who con-
tends that the constitutionally protected freedom to avoid pro-
creation implies its converse, the freedom to procreate. 
Robertson defines this procreative freedom broadly enough to 
encompass resort to noncoital methods of reproduction and to 
third party reproductive "collaborators."49 From the many Su-
preme Court decisions protecting the right of parents to rear 
and raise their children,5° Robertson spins out an argument for 
according constitutional protection to efforts to bring children 
into the world so that they can be reared. 111 Single persons as 
well as married couples may have some claim to this "positive" 
procreative freedom. An individual's alleged entitlement to seek 
personal fulfillment through procreation should not hinge on 
whether he or she is married,112 especially if a child's welfare is 
not jeopardized by having an unmarried parent.53 Children 
raised by single parents may experience more psychological and 
social difficulties than children raised by two parents.54 None-
theless, it is not the particular family form in which a child lives 
that seems to be crucial for the child's ultimate well-being, but 
the nature of the personal relationships between the child and 
49. Robertson, supra note 41, at 415-16, and 405, n.2. 
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
51. Robertson, supra note 41, at 417. See also Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the 
Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291 (1982). 
52. Robertson admits he is on shakier constitutional grounds when he advocates ex-
tending the argument for procreative autonomy to single persons. Robertson, supra note 
41, at 418. Even in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), only four Supreme Court 
Justices referred explicitly to a single person's "right" to avoid conception. The Court 
has not addressed directly either a married person's or a single person's alleged "right" 
to conceive. 
53. For an argument that single persons should enjoy as much procreative freedom as 
married persons, see Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemi-
nation, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1981); for an argument that they should not, see Smith 
& Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 263 (1984). 
54. See, e.g., the results of an important study of children raised by single parents in 
Dornbusch, Carlsmith, Bushwall, Ritter, Leiderman, Hastorf, & Gross, Single Parents, 
Extended Households, and the Control of Adolescents, 56 CHILD DEV. 326 (1985). Based 
on a representative national sample of adolescents, the authors studied the interrelations 
among family structure, family decision-making, and deviant behavior among adoles-
cents. They find that male children raised by single mothers show the greatest amount of 
deviant behavior, as they define "deviance." Id. at 329. They also find, however, that the 
presence of any adult in the household in addition to the mother reduces the level of the 
adolescent's deviant social behavior. 
878 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
one or more caregivers.1111 
While subscribing to the general thrust of the argument for 
constitutional protection of procreative choices,116 I have some 
reservations. First, the cases cited in support of this argument 
deal with the consequences of sexual activities. They do not ad-
dress, and indeed, do not contemplate, the act of procreation 
through the agency of laboratory techniques or with genetic con-
tributions from third parties.117 Second, I read the cases support-
ing parental autonomy and the values of family life118 as placing 
greater emphasis on the opportunity to rear a child, and on the 
vital social and cultural functions performed by childrearing, 
than on the process by which a child is acquired;59 A child's 
55. See generally, Sroufe, The Coherence of Individual Development, 39 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 834 (1979) (a useful introduction to contemporary versions of the attachment 
theory of child development that originated in the work of John Bowlby); Ainsworth, 
Bell & Stayton, Individual Differences in Strange Situation Behaviour of One-year-
olds, in THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN SOCIAL RELATIONS 17 (H. Schaeffer ed. 1971). Although 
they differ on a number of theoretical and practical issues, the psychological parenting 
theorists and the attachment theorists would agree with the assertion that children 
raised by single parents can turn out just as well or just as poorly as children raised by 
two parents. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as GFS]; Waters & Noyes, Psychological 
Parenting vs. Attachment Theory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505 (1983-84). 
56. It is unlikely that English courts would ever find a protected right to procreative 
freedom akin to what the U.S. Supreme Court might "locate." Parker, Surrogate Moth-
ering: An Overview, 14 FAM. L. 140 (1984). For an articulate statement of the Christian, 
and particularly the Catholic theological view that "no society has ever . . . understood 
the methods and measures of reproduction to be a matter of private choice," see Noo-
nan, Christian Tradition and the Control of Human Reproduction, J. OF CHRISTIAN 
JURIS. 1 (1983). 
57. Despite Robertson's assertion that a right to conceive can be derived from a right 
to avoid conception, there is in fact no logical nexus between the two claimed "rights." 
Surely, the opinions that deal with the dissemination of contraceptives to teenagers or 
with the circumstances under which minors can have an abortion cannot be read as pro-
tecting an interest in becoming pregnant, H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Even 
if these and other cases, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), are read as protecting an interest in intimate associa-
tion, such an interest is also distinct from an interest in resorting to third party collabo-
rators to produce a child. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 
624 (1980). An elaboration of the distinction between protecting against unwanted 
pregnancies and protecting an interest in conceiving was made in the legal analysis pre-
pared for the EAB; see Flannery, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro 
Fertilization, 67 GEO. L.J. 1295, 1302-04 (1979). 
58. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 50, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 421 U.S. 
494 (1977). 
59. These cases assume the existence of a child within a nuclear or extended family 
setting. They deal with the reciprocal nature of parental rights and duties towards their 
children, not with the process of bringing the children into existence. For discussions of 
just how far removed the childrearing cases are from any claims for a broad right to 
procreative, as opposed to parental autonomy, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973); Hafen, The Constitutional Status of 
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right to be reared and society's stake in protecting a child's need 
for parenting deservedly gets more attention than an adult's in-
terest in propagating.60 Third, neither the Supreme Court nor· 
any lower federal court has accorded any constitutional protec-
tion to claims by adoptees that they have a fundamental interest 
in connecting with their genealogical heritage and should there-
fore be permitted to learn the identity of their biological par-
ents. 61 Adoptees have argued that in denying them this informa-
tion, states have irreparably injured their sense of 
"personhood."62 Is it reasonable, then, to expect that an adult's 
claim for constitutional protection for an interest in connecting 
to future generations through the use of noncoital means of re-
Marriage, Kin..•hip, & Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 
MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983). From a different perspective, Thomas Grey argues that the 
"Court has given no support to the notion that the right to privacy protects seimal free-
dom." Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 1980, at 83, 86. 
60. In recent cases that consider the circumstances under which the parental rights of 
biological parents may be terminated, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), the Court has protected relational interests be-
tween parents and their children against termination procedures that do not accord with 
due process requirements. In recent cases that consider the interests of unwed fathers in 
obtaining custody of their biological offspring, or in preventing the adoption of those 
offspring by someone other than a blood relative, the Court has decidedly refused to 
grant such parental prerogatives to any father simply on the basis of his biological rela-
tionship to his child. The Court has protected the parental interests of only those unwed 
fathers who have entered into and attempted to sustain an actual personal and emo-
tional relationship with their offspring, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The procreative act alone has been a basis for imposing 
financial responsibilities on biological parents, but it has never been the basis by itself 
for granting custodial rights or for preventing the adoption of the child by someone else. 
The scope of constitutional protection of the rights of unwed fathers has been much 
discussed and is generally beyond the scope of this paper. A useful recent analysis is in 
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Rob-
ertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984). 
61. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 995 (1979). State courts have been similarly unresponsive; see, e.g., In re Roger 
B., 84 Ill.2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981). 
62. Although many state courts have permitted the disclosure of birth parents' iden-
tities to adoptees, they have not done so on the basis of constitutional analysis, but by 
construing broadly the "good cause" exceptions typically included in non-disclosure stat-
utes. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 
A.2d 646 (1977). Instead of pursuing their constitutional claims, those interested in 
opening adoption records have turned to state legislatures where they are beginning .to 
have greater success. About 18-20 states now have some kind of procedure through which 
adoptees may be able to learn the identities of their birth parents. These recent statu-
tory changes are summarized in Pierce, Survey of State Laws & Legislation on Access to· 
Adoption Records, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3035 (1984). At least two other states have 
created similar registry procedures since Pierce completed his survey, 11 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) 1128 (1985). 
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production would be taken more seriously than the adoptee's de-
sire to be linked back in time to his or her genetic heritage? 
Fourth, even if the claims for procreative autonomy were to be 
explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, federal and state gov-
ernments would not be obliged to subsidize IVF or ET research 
and treatment, nor to do more than accept the general validity 
of surrogacy arrangements.63 
To date, there have been no sustained efforts to prohibit IVF 
or ET,64 nor are any likely to develop so long as these proce-
dures are used primarily for relief of infertility and not to gener-
ate embryos either for experimental purposes or to rearrange 
their genetic composition.611 And despite some indications to the 
contrary, a few state courts, acting without explicit enabling leg-
islation,66 are recognizing the validity of certain aspects of surro-
gacy arrangements.67 From a practical perspective, if not from a 
63. In the abortion context, cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (finding no public 
duty to provide abortion services to low-income women). 
64. In 1979 Illinois enacted a statute intended to discourage physicians from offering 
IVF, but subsequent interpretations of the statute by the State Attorney General have 
narrowed its scope. Pennsylvania has taken steps to monitor the results of IVF and ET, 
but has not moved to prohibit these services, Andrews, supra note 4, at 793. 
65. At hearings held before the EAB in 1978-79, opposition to research on or to 
"tinkering" with "extra" embryos was more vociferous than was any concern about the 
use of IVF and ET as infertility treatments; see EAB REP., supra note 6; Abramowitz, 
supra note 6. 
66. Legislation to regulate surrogacy contracts has been introduced in more than 
twenty states and the District of Columbia. Most of these bills would validate at least 
some aspects of surrogacy arrangements, but several would attempt to ban all forms of 
commercial surrogacy. These bills are listed and briefly summarized in Pierce, Survey of 
State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP. (B.N.A.) 3001 (1985). 
One court has interpreted its state legislature's failure to enact a measure explicitly legit-
imizing surrogacy as a "clear signal" that surrogacy violates the state's general statutory 
ban against baby-selling, Kentucky v. SPA, Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1985). 
67. The Michigan Supreme Court has reversed a Court of Appeals decision that had 
held that the state courts lacked jurisdiction to determine the paternity of a child born 
to a married woman pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 
Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985). The 
Michigan court found that the state's Paternity Act should not bar the alleged father 
from having his paternity and his child support obligations established, despite the two 
statutory presumptions that treat the child born after the artificial insemination of the 
mother as the legal child of the mother and her husband. According to the court, neither 
presumption will operate to stop the alleged biological father from establishing his pater-
nity, if the mother's husband will simply withhold his consent to his wife's AID. This is 
an awkward way of recognizing the validity of surrogacy agreements because in practice, 
they do not proceed unless the surrogate gestator's husband agrees to her AID. The pro-
cedure suggested by the Michigan court requires that the surrogate's husband agree in 
fact to his wife's AID, while "officially" withholding his consent in order to fulfill the 
requirements of the Paternity Act. It is preferable to create a statutory presumption that 
would permit the determination of paternity in accord with the intentions of the parties 
to the surrogacy agreement without having to pretend that what does occur did not in 
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constitutional one, attempts to prohibit these activities would be 
ill-advised. Our experience with past crusades against behavior 
that some people find distasteful or immoral (for example, 
drinking, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality) has shown the 
futility of legislation against morally-controversial conduct for 
which there is strong social support. Childless couples would no 
doubt take recourse to surreptitious purveyors of reproductive 
services. Prices would rise, noncoital baby-production would be 
subject to even less monitoring than it is now, and the welfare of 
all the participants, especially of the offspring, would be 
jeopardized. 68 
Our attention is best directed, however, not toward the uncer-
tain future course of constitutional doctrine, but toward the un-
resolved legal and policy issues presented by the bustling com-
mercial market that already exists for noncoital reproductive 
services. I will select a few of the issues now being discussed in 
professional journals and in more general publications69 for 
closer examination. My aim is to show both how difficult and 
fact occur. See infra text accompanying notes 169-79. The court's decision does not ad-
dress such other aspects of surrogacy agreements as the payment of a fee to the surro-
gate or the adoption of the child by the biological father's wife. For the moment at least, 
an earlier Michigan Court of Appeals decision declaring unenforceable any agreement to 
make payments in connection with an adoption or release of parental rights remains 
intact, Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1183 (1983). See also Kentucky v. SPA, Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (1985), where 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals declared unlawful "any contracts and procedures [that 
seek] to financially benefit from the contractual creation of human life and its subse-
quent transfer for what must be considered adoptive purposes." In contrast, a District of 
Columbia court ordered an investigation of the circumstances surrounding a surrogacy 
contract and suggested that if the court can be satisfied that the agreement was not 
fraudulently obtained, it would seek ways to construe the D.C. Paternity and Adoption 
Acts so as to permit the contract to be fully performed. In re R.K.S., 10 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) 1383 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. 1984). 
68. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhiie to respond to the reservations just expressed 
about the constitutional argument for procreative autonomy and to continue exploring 
the contours of that argument. The claims for constitutional protection are useful for 
challenging any restrictive statutes that might be passed, as well as for seeking a narrow 
construction of existing prohibitory measures and a broad reading of those statutes and 
regulations that could support noncoital reproductive services. Robertson, supra note 41, 
has not convinced me that a broad right to conceive can be implied from a right not to 
conceive, but his persistence is admirable. 
69. In addition to the comprehensive discussions in Robertson, supra note 41, and 
Wadlington, supra note 23, and the impassioned arguments about the moral and social 
implications of the new reproductive possibilities in Kass, supra note 5, there are more 
than a dozen recent law review commentaries on the issues raised by noncoital reproduc-
tion, as well as countless articles in the popular press and in such medical journals as 
FERTILITY & STERILITY, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, J. OF HUM. REPROD'N, J.A.M.A. and 
the British journals, LANCET and NATURE. Although some of these mention the issues I 
discuss here, most do not analyze them in much detail, nor try to develop, as I hope to 
do, a special focus on the interests of the offspring. 
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how essential it is to create a regulatory apparatus that would 
not place the government in the business of controlling human 
reproduction70 but which would, in accord with the principles 
.sketched above,71 1) facilitate procreative choices, 2) minimize 
the risk of harm to the participants, especially the children, and 
3) provide some mechanism for assuring and improving the 
quality of the services offered by doctors, lawyers and other 
intermediaries. 
Ill. REGULATION OF THE BABY-MAKING MARKET: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR NEEDED PROTECTIONS 
A. Facilitating Choices 
To facilitate the reproductive choices of childless persons, 
some combination of public and private action is needed: first, 
to aid these persons in making an informed and voluntary deci-
sion rather than an imposed one; next, to ensure that, once 
made, a decision can be acted upon; and finally, to support, al-
though not necessarily to guarantee, the fulfillment of the rea-
sonable expectation that the end result will be a healthy child. 
1. Facilitating informed and voluntary decisions- An in-
formed and voluntary decision is not easily reached. The child-
less face a bewildering array of possibilities. Even if the costs of 
different alternatives were identical, which they are not, and all 
alternatives were equally available, which they are not, it would 
remain difficult to assess the appropriateness of any given alter-
native for particular people. For example, is the prospect of an 
IVF child who is related genetically to both parents sufficiently 
attractive to offset for a woman the physical discomfort and 
70. See, e.g., the warning of the EAB: "Where reproductive decisions are concerned, 
it is important to guard against unwarranted governmental intrusion into personal and 
marital privacy," EAB REP., supra note 6. Many commentators are fond of conjuring up 
Huxleyan and Orwellian images to remind us of the dangers inherent in public control of 
reproduction; see, e.g., Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: 
Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1983) 
(not as useful for its analysis as for its listing of the science fictional accounts of public 
control of reproduction and for its list of other articles on issues raised by IVF, ET and 
surrogacy). I am reminded of the Nazi government's declaration that the nation's stock 
of ovaries were a natural resource and the property of the German state, R.N. Proctor, 
The Politics of Purity: Origins of the Ideal of Neutral Science 501 (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University 1984) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.), and of the 
current efforts of the Chinese government to restrict family size. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
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risks associated with superovulation drugs, a surgical egg-re-
trieval procedure under anaesthesia, a predictable number of 
spontaneous miscarriages of an implanted embryo, or a preg-
nancy that is otherwise complicated and may terminate prema-. 
turely?12 Is the allure sufficient to offset for the couple the risk 
of possible physical harm to their offspring from the process of 
in vitro fertilization and incubation? What about an eventual 
psychological let down if their specially produced child fails to 
live up to their perhaps exaggerated expectations for her or for 
what her existence would do for the quality of their lives? Alter-
natively, for those who are potential candidates for either in vi-
tro fertilization or donor embryo transfer, is a woman compen-
sated for her lack of a genetic connection to her child by the fact 
that ET does not involve any surgical procedures and does offer 
her an opportunity to experience pregnancy? And what of the 
intended father's psychological reaction to the use of his sperm 
to artificially inseminate an anonymous egg and embryo donor? 
How can a couple determine whether the physical or psychologi-
cal risks associated with IVF or ET are comparable to those as-
sociated with surgical or other medical procedures used to repair 
damaged oviducts or to otherwise improve the chances for "nat-
ural" reproduction? How can a couple who is queasy about diffi-
cult and protracted medical procedures assess whether hiring a 
surrogate uterine hostess constitutes a more suitable alternative 
for them? By turning to this medically simpler but legally and 
psychologically more complicated alternative, does the couple 
take on a different but equally imponderable set of risks to 
themselves, their offspring, and the surrogate? For which 
couples will the desire to have a child be satisfied by adopting 
someone not related biologically to either of them? Will the de-
gree of this satisfaction be affected if the adopted child is one 
who previously suffered emotional or physical deprivation or 
who, without their decision to adopt him or her, might have 
been deprived of an opportunity to form a stable attachment to 
any parents? 
Childless persons ought to be made cognizant of the full range 
of their reproductive and childrearing options, including adop-
tion. They deserve some guidance about how to determine which 
alternatives are medically or physically appropriate for them. 
And they need some clues about how to evaluate the psychologi-
cal, financial, and legal consequences of each alternative. At 
72. For a graphic description of the procedures entailed by IVF, see Yovich, 
Monozygotic Twins from IVF, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 833 (1984). 
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least one "consumer's guide" to the new reproductive techniques 
has appeared. 73 An artificial intelligence program to help infer-
tile couples choose an appropriate treatment is in the works.74 
The media have been filled with personal "human interest" ac-
counts of experiences with IVF, ET, and surrogacy.71~ More sys-
tematic and personal reproductive counseling services already 
are available in the private market. IVF clinics and many of the 
lawyers who arrange surrogacy contracts claim that they provide 
such counseling.76 In Britain, the Warnock Commission has rec-
ommended that publicly-subsidized investigations and consulta-
tions be offered to all individuals with a potential infertility 
problem and that psychological counseling be routinely included 
in any infertility treatment.77 In this country, such services 
might provide a valuable supplement to services available in the 
private sector, especially if they were to become part of an ongo-
ing public monitoring of the quality and success of noncoital 
reproduction. 78 · 
Publicly-funded reproductive counseling is, of course, unlikely 
to be available in the United States within the foreseeable fu-
ture. 79 Yet a special public responsibility exists to protect the 
welfare of children whose parentage may end up being the sub-
ject of private contracts. Because the state, rather than private 
individuals, ultimately confers the legal status of parent and 
child, the state may justifiably be concerned that persons who 
73. L.B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTIL-
ITY TREATMENTS (1984). 
74. Diamond, Student Applies Artificial Intelligence to Infertility, Stanford Campus 
Report, Oct. 24, 1984, at 13. 
75. E.g., the Donahue show and other TV talk-shows; Markoutsas, Women Who 
Have Babies for Other Women, Goon HOUSEKEEPING, Apr. 1981, at 96. 
76. Lamb discussions, supra note 25. See also 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY (1984), and 
Handel, supra note 22. One gets the impression, however, that the activity characterized 
as counseling is in fact a device for physicians and lawyers to weed out "emotionally 
unstable" persons from consideration for a particular service or treatment. 
77. WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, ch. 2, § 2.12. 
78. For a discussion of such public monitoring, see infra notes 230-38 and accompa-
nying text. 
79. The United States has fewer publicly subsidized educational, counseling, and 
health services addressed to issues of human sexuality and reproduction than do most 
other advanced industrialized countries. An important recent study by the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute indicates that the rates of adolescent (ages 15-19) pregnancies and 
abortions in the United States are substantially higher than the rates in Sweden, France, 
the Netherlands, Canada, England, and Wales where sex education is routinely taught, 
and contraceptives are inexpensive or free. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 1. This 
study of teen-age sexuality is relevant to an analysis of the government's role in the new 
reproductive techniques because it suggests a causal connection between the public sup-
port of services pertaining to the relief of childlessness and the capacity of childless indi-
viduals to make informed and appropriate decisions about their own conduct. 
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separate the genetic from the gestational and nurturing aspects 
of parenting fully comprehend what they are doing. And the 
state's interest in assuring all children an opportunity to have 
parents calls for more sustained efforts to make adoption a feasi-
ble and attractive alternative to childless couples.80 This re-
quires something more than general dissemination of informa-
tion about reproduction. This is not to suggest, however, that 
there "must" be publicly supported reproductive counseling, nor 
that public services should preempt private ones.81 But the 
state's interest provides a reason to propose that some combina-
tion of private and public reproductive counseling be made 
much more widely available than is now the case.82 As a policy 
matter, public funds would be spent better now to support such 
services than spent in the future to alleviate what may prove to 
be the unfortunate consequences of uninformed or unreflective 
private decisions.83 
Whether reproductive counselors are privately or publicly sub-
sidized, what would they do? In theory, reproductive counseling 
seems less intrusive than screening for parental "fitness."84 
Counselors would assist people to choose an option appropriate 
to their particular medical, psychological, and financial situa-
tions, rather than deny them an opportunity to make certain 
choices. In practice, counselors who have doubts about a couple's 
parenting capacity could profess neutrality, while actually at-
tempting to dissuade them from seeking to obtain a child. Even 
the truly "neutral" counselor would have difficulty defining her 
task. Our knowledge about noncoital reproductive processes and 
their long run consequences is far from complete and our atti-
tudes toward these processes are still being formed. The values 
we attach to parenting and to different styles of family life lack 
80. It should surely call for reluctance to eliminate what few incentives now exist for 
people to adopt children. 
81. Recall the warnings, supra note 70. 
82. Such counseling may be as important, if not more so, for any third party partici-
pant in noncoital reproduction: the paid contributors of sperm, eggs, embryos, or babies. 
The discussion here, however, considers the wisdom of providing counseling for childless 
persons who are trying to decide whether to pursue IVF, ET, AID, or surrogacy. 
83. I do not intend to argue that reproductive counseling services deserve a higher 
priority than, for example, preventive social services for adults determined to be in a 
high risk category as potential child abusers. But I believe that a general commitment to 
avoid state intervention in private procreative choices is consistent with supporting occa-
sional interventions that are likely to improve the quality of those choices, as well as 
protect the welfare of any offspring. See generally Professor Wald's Introduction to this 
Symposium, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 799 (1985). 
84. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of how such 
screening can be a futile and potentially harmful enterprise. 
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the stability they may have shown in the past. Given these un-
certainties, the most salient characteristic of good reproductive 
counseling may be listing questions for people to ponder, rather 
than providing standards or guidelines for resolving them. 
Counseling may also illustrate for prospective parents the dif-
ference between a thorough understanding of suitable procrea-
tive alternatives and "informed consent" to a particular medical 
treatment or legal procedure. The medical personnel who offer 
IVF, ET, or AID secure the "informed consent" of their patients 
primarily to protect themselves against future allegations of 
malpractice. They ask patients to accept the risk of legal ambi-
guities as well as of physical or psychological harms85 and to ab-
solve the medical professionals from responsibility for providing 
compensation in the event that such harms actually occur.86 In 
the context of surrogate gestator contracts, informed consent 
similarly allocates risks between the uterine hostess and the in-
tended parents, as well as between these parties and their law-
yers. 87 In contrast, a different standard evaluates efforts to facil-
itate informed decisions by infertile couples. Counselors aim to 
get such couples to contemplate what they are prepared to en-
dure in order to obtain a child. This includes, but is not limited 
to, the legal question of how many of the risks of medical and 
legal procedures they are willing to assume. The interests pro-
tected in the two cases are distinct: informed consent limits the 
liability of the professionals upon whom the adults who want to 
become parents must rely, while informed decision making aims 
to safeguard the interests of adults in pursuing what they them-
selves have determined to be their most appropriate route to 
parenting. 
2. Facilitating implementation of decisions- Once childless 
85. Buster interview, supra note 29. See also the Information Pamphlet for Partici-
pating Couples from the Harbor-UCLA Medical Center Ovum Transfer Program. (Copy 
on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.) 
86. Among the more useful analyses of informed consent in the context of the pa-
tient-doctor relationship are PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH 
CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE 
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982); Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and 
the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984); Schneyer, Informed Consent 
and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wisc. L. 
REV. 124. 
87. California attorneys William Handel and Bernard Sherwyn describe, almost with 
glee, how they ask childless clients to consent to their performance of what might be 
criminal or tortious activities in the interests of completing a surrogacy arrangement, 
Handel, supra note 22; Sherwyn, Attorney Duties in the Area of New Reproductive 
Technologies, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 799 (1984). 
SUMMER 1985] From Coitus to Commerce 887 
couples decide which parenting option they wish to pursue, how 
can they be assisted to act effectively upon their choice? Alloca-
tion of any scarce resource, like noncoital reproductive services, 
inevitably denies access to some people. The challenge is to de-
velop selection criteria that do not unduly burden procreative 
autonomy. These criteria should be relevant to the characteris-
tics of a particular service and should be applied neutrally-that 
is, in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discrimina-
tory-among those who meet the relevant criteria. A prospective 
parent's medical condition is surely relevant to the allocation de-
cision. Also relevant may be a person's psychological capacity to 
tolerate the complex medical procedures and legal ambiguities 
entailed in noncoital reproduction.88 The principle of neutrality 
would not be violated by insisting that people have certain diag-
nostic tests, nor, for example, by excluding from IVF a woman 
who has had a- hysterectomy. 
Where does the search for relevant criteria and neutral princi-
ples of application go once the threshold of eligibility has been 
established? It depends on who determines "relevance." One 
decisionmaker might value the goal of giving all adults an oppor-
tunity to be parents. In that event, priority might be given to 
those adults who have never had children or who are nearly too 
old to bear or raise a child. Or, for example, instead of giving a 
small number of people up to five chances to conceive through 
IVF, a larger number of persons might each be given one chance. 
Another decisionmaker might place uppermost the welfare of 
children, serving only married couples who are "fit" potential 
parents and refusing to serve unmarried persons. If a third deci-
sionmaker hoped to validate a certain procedure as a legitimate 
treatment rather than as a mere "experiment," priority might 
not go to those for whom the procedure is a last resort but to 
younger men and women who are in excellent general health and 
who, although childless, have not exhausted their finances and 
their psyches through years of futile efforts to conceive. Still an-
other decisionmaker might believe that procreative autonomy is 
so broad as to encompass efforts to select the "best" combina-
tion of genetic materials and gestational environments for pro-
ducing a child. In this case, even a threshold requirement of in-
fertility might yield to selection by lottery or, at the other 
88. Many physicians would prefer to exclude from IVF or ET those individuals whose 
anxiety is so pervasive that they are unlikely to achieve a viable pregnancy, no matter 
how many sophisticated medical procedures they undergo. It is not clear, however, that 
there are any reliable tests for discerning those we might call the "permanently psycho-
somatic infertile." Lamb discussions, supra note 25; Buster interview, supra note 29. 
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extreme, to selection according to who is willing to pay the high-
est price for a "custom-made" child. 
At present, allocation decisions for IVF and ET are being 
made by private physicians and hospital personnel, acting for 
the most part in a private commercial and professional con-
text. 89 It should come as no surprise that the medical profession-
als are selecting patients according to criteria at the more so-
cially conservative end of the spectrum sketched above. Indeed, 
the word "patients," rather than "customers" or "clients," terms 
preferred by the private investors in IVF and ET clinics,90 
manifests the physicians' desire to be associated with a reputa-
ble medical endeavor. The doctors hope to garner financial sup-
port for research to improve the quality of IVF and ET proce-
dures and to learn more about embryo development and the 
reproductive process. They emphatically deny any interest in 
"gene manipulation" and insist that IVF and ET are simply 
promising "infertility treatments."91 Obstetricians and gynecolo-
gists already contend with large numbers of malpractice claims 
and pay some of the highest settlements.92 Understandably risk 
averse, they do not wish to lose their chances for securing broad 
social and financial support for IVF and ET by treating "unco-
operative" people,93 or those with idiosyncratic life styles.94 In 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. 
90. Embryo transfer specialist, Dr. Buster, claims, for example, that he is somewhat 
uneasy about the commercial terminology used by the venture capitalists who have sup-
plied the research funds for his ET program. Nonetheless, he stresses the importance of 
using "the best marketing and business principles" and talks of "overnight delivery net-
works" for speeding three- to five-day-old embryos to potential recipients who will ges-
tate them. Buster interview, supra note 29. See also the accounts of the commercial 
prospects for ET in Brotman, supra note 29; Chapman, Going for the Gold in the Baby 
Business, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 41. 
91. See, e.g., HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (1984); 
Abramowitz, supra note 6; American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on IVF, 41 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984) [hereinafter cited as AFS Statement]. 
92. In the years 1975-78, nearly 15% of total malpractice claims filed were against 
obstetrician-gynecologists, and 18% of the awards were paid by them or, more accu-
rately, by their insurers. 2 NAIC MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 3 (1978). Since then, these rates 
have continued to rise, Malcolm, Fear of Malpractice Suits Spurring Some Doctors to 
Leave Obstetrics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 1. 
93. Dr. Buster was so eager to project the "correct" view of ET that his medical team 
hired a public relations consultant to supervise media coverage of their activities. Buster 
interview, supra note 29. 
94. Of the licensed physicians who perform traditional AID, only 10% report that 
they will treat an unmarried woman, Curie-Cohen, supra note 24, at 595. Several sperm 
banks willingly serve lesbians and unmarried heterosexual women; for example, the 
Women's Health Center in Oakland, California. See REP. HuM. REPROD. L. R-30 (1982). 
The recent publication in FERTILITY AND STERILITY of an article sympathetic to the AID 
of single women suggests that attitudes toward unmarried AID parents may be changing. 
McGuire & Alexander, Artificial Insemination of Single Women, 43 FERTILITY & STERIL-
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sum, medical professionals are less interested in treating all peo-
ple who could benefit from laboratory-assisted conception than 
in helping those who could enhance the reputation of IVF and 
ET. 
As a consequence of these concerns, medical personnel screen 
prospective candidates for IVF or ET not merely to determine if 
their infertility problem is amenable to these treatments. Candi-
dates must also be married,911 have the ability to pay, and be 
perceived by the medical staff as fit potential parents. The law-
yers who facilitate surrogacy contracts are probably applying 
similar criteria to prospective parents. But except for the state-
ments of a few lawyer-brokers,96 who claim to be scrupulous in 
their search for "emotionally stable" couples and surrogates, in-
formation is scarce on the selection criteria they actually use. In 
some ways, access to surrogacy may be easier than access to IVF 
or ET, because couples are asked fewer questions about the rea-
sons for their childlessness. But in other ways, access may be as 
or more limited because the number of acceptable uterine host-
esses is not nearly as large as the number of prospective parent-
ing couples, and because many couples exclude themselves after 
learning of the legal and psychological ambiguities that surround 
surrogacy. Except for a brief analysis of the commercial aspects 
of surrogacy,97 my discussion of access to noncoital reproduction 
focuses on access to IVF and ET. 
The search for parental fitness is not worth the effort. In addi-
tion to raising some constitutional concerns about imposing on 
couples who seek IVF or ET a standard that is not applied to 
those who engage in coital reproduction, it is not at all clear that 
such a search will yield reliable results. Childless couples who 
have spent years trying to conceive are not likely to appreciate 
any questioning of their capacity to be good parents. Anyone 
who has glanced at the case law or literature on the termination 
of parental rights knows that we have a hard time figuring out 
which people are unfit parents. 98 Even less consensus exists on 
ITV 182 (1985). 
95. Cf. WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, which recommends providing treatment for 
"couples," meaning "heterosexual couples living together in a stable relationship, 
whether married or not," §§ 2.5-2.12. 
96. See, e.g., Handel, supra note 22; Keane & Breo, supra note 32; Sherwyn, supra 
note 87. 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 111-18. 
98. See, e.g., Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557 (1983-84) for a thoughtful account by someone who has had 
to test the assumptions and purported findings of the social science literature on the 
issue of parental "unfitness" against her complex and troubling experience as a New 
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what makes for "fitness" in a parent. This is not to deny that 
protecting the welfare of children warrants some concern about 
the characteristics of the adults who will raise them. But the 
small number of unworthies who might be detected and weeded 
out by fitness screening hardly justifies the financial and social 
costs of trying to devise reliable tests. Nothing in the history of 
adoption suggests that even the elaborate investigation of poten-
tial parents by adoption agencies using socially conservative cri-
teria, permits reliable prediction of how fit these parents will ac-
tually be. What these criteria and investigations do succeed in 
doing, however, is to discourage people who are concerned about 
their privacy, or convinced that they will not pass muster, from 
seeking a child through adoption agencies. Many of these people 
have found babies, independently, through less intrusive non-
agency intermediaries.99 Surrogacy arrangements may, in fact, 
be simply an "innovation" in the well-established market for in-
dependent adoptions. The agencies have never been able to 
demonstrate that those who acquired their children indepen-
dently have any less parenting ability than those who acquired 
children through agencies.100 If what the gatekeepers to 
noncoital reproduction really want to know is whether the 
couple who intend to raise a child will remain married to each 
other, no test will elicit such information. Funds would be better 
spent on counseling services to assist couples in dealing with the 
special problems that raising an IVF or ET child might pose 
than on attempting to ferret out "unsuitable" parents. 
Skepticism about screening for parental fitness would be even 
more appropriate if the government were someday to join the 
York City Family Court judge. 
99. An influential Note written 35 years ago argued persuasively that the "agencies 
themselves are partially to blame for the fact that three out of every four adoptions are 
independently arranged." Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated 
Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 736 (1950). Since then, adoption agency efforts to convince 
birth mothers or prospective adoptive parents to deal with them, rather than with inde-
pendent doctors or lawyers, have been notably unsuccessful. MEEZAN, supra note 9, re-
ports that many prospective adoptive parents perceive adoption agency procedures as 
inflexible and intrusive and therefore turn to the independent baby-market. Meezan's 
critique of agency practices has particular importance because his study was commis-
sioned in the 1970's by the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), a voluntary asso-
ciation of adoption and other child welfare agencies who have long opposed independent 
placements. For other accounts of how adoptive parents resent broad inquiries by agen-
cies into their social, religious, financial, sexual, and personal behaviors, see H. KIRK, 
SHARED FATE (1964); A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN, R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as ADOPTION TRIANGLE); Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 
71 A.B.A. J., June 1985, at 53, 54. 
100. There are no CWLA or other agency-sponsored studies showing that children 
placed independently fare less well than those placed by agencies. 
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private entrepreneurs and offer IVF or ET in publicly-subsi-
dized clinics. The temptation to look for couples and gene do-
nors who could improve the quality of our species would be 
great and the temptation to prevent certain people from becom-
ing parents would be even greater. 101 At present, the federal and 
state governments are only indirectly involved with IVF or ET. 
Clinics associated with public hospitals or universities could face 
constitutional challenges if they rejected a potential patient be-
cause of marital status102 or for an alleged lack of parenting 
skills. 
Because there is no federal funding for IVF or ET research, 
physicians are not required to submit their research protocols to 
an institutional review board (IRB) for prior approval. 103 Even if 
federal funds were available, IRB approval would not be neces-
sary if physicians claimed they were offering treatment, rather 
than doing research. Nonetheless, to protect themselves as well 
as their patients, physicians may voluntarily seek IRB approval 
before embarking on IVF or ET programs.104 If this occurs, the 
selection process will be responsive to whatever criteria are 
deemed suitable by the IRBs, which function both as quasi-fed-
eral administrative agencies and as local review boards. 1011 Per-
haps the best that we could hope for, if public oversight of IVF 
and ET increases, is that rather than devising their own criteria, 
public review boards would simply see to it that the private 
decisionmakers did not turn anyone away for arbitrary or irrele-
vant reasons. 106 
101. Some commentators have proposed a general state licensing scheme for parents. 
See, e.g., LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 182 (1980). 
102. At least one such challenge was raised by a single woman whose request for 
artificial insemination was denied by the sperm bank affiliated with Wayne State Medi-
cal School. She sued, claiming violation of her constitutional right to procreative auton-
omy, but the suit was settled before trial when Wayne agreed to treat her. For an ac-
count of the incident, see Note, The 14th Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right 
to be a Single Parent through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 
251, 254 (1982). 
103. IRB approval is required for any federally funded research involving human 
subjects, R. LEVINE, ETHICS & REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1981); Quigley & An-
drews, supra note 7, at 350. 
104. Lamb discussions, supra note 25. 
105. Levine, supra note 103, at 208-12. Before its demise, the EAB, supra note 6, 
recommended that IVF or ET be limited to married couples using their own sperm and 
ova. IRS-determined criteria might be somewhat broader, allowing the use of third party 
genetic contributions, but not receptive to the prospect of treating unmarried persons. 
Abramowitz, supra note 6; Quigley & Andrews, supra note 7. 
106. IRBs are required to see to it that the selection of human subjects for medical 
research is "equitable," 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(3) (1985). Cf. the recommendation in the 
WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, at § 2.13, that anyone denied access to a particular infer-
tility treatment be given a full statement of the reasons for the denial. 
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The requirement that the couple have the ability to pay their 
physicians, as well as any third party gene contributors, actually 
cuts several ways. Because most insurance companies and health 
maintenance organizations have refused to pay for IVF or ET, 107 
only those couples with a significant amount of money to spare 
can afford to enter the market. 108 Thus, as with other costly and 
considerably more sophisticated procedures (for example, heart 
transplants), a great many people who could benefit from IVF 
and ET are excluded by financial considerations. This situation 
could change, however, if the proponents of IVF and ET con-
vince the insurance companies that these procedures would be 
more efficacious and less costly than tuboplasty or other surgical 
measures designed to alleviate infertility. 100 Among those who 
can afford to pay today's high rates, there are bound to be 
couples who resent elaborate medical or psychological screening. 
They may exert pressure on IVF and ET clinics to ease both 
medical and parental fitness requirements. Perhaps it is more 
accurate to suggest that the clinics with strict eligibility require-
ments may find themselves with fewer patients than the clinics 
that care less about the social characteristics of the people they 
treat. Another possibility is that couples who are well off will 
seek treatment at small private clinics that develop reputations 
for being emotionally supportive, rather than at large medical 
centers which may have a greater range of technical services, but 
which are perceived to be indifferent to the emotional aspects of 
repeated efforts to conceive a child. 110 
Because the clinics need fees from patients to cover their own 
expenses, they will be under some competitive pressure to at-
tract childless couples and may move toward more flexible selec-
tion criteria, as well as toward lower fees. If, however, IVF pro-
cedures prove to be more successful in certain clinical settings 
107. Their rationale is that success rates are too low, the long term safety is untested, 
and the procedures are "not medically necessary." Lamb discussions, supra note 25. Sev-
eral lawsuits are pending against medical insurers and health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), alleging that their characterization of IVF and ET as "experimental" or 
"merely cosmetic" is made in bad faith to justify denial of coverage; telephone interview 
with Lauren Hallinan, San Francisco lawyer representing women suing Kaiser Founda-
tion Health Plan (June 10, 1985). See also Carlsen, Women Sue Kaiser Over In Vitro 
Coverage, S.F. Chronicle, May 31, 1985, at 6. Most health insurance carriers and HMOs 
will pay, however, for expenses incurred during pregnancy, including diagnostic proce-
dures such as amniocentesis or ultrasound. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33. 
109. Lamb discussions, supra note 25; Buster interview, supra note 29. 
110. See, e.g., AFS Statement, supra note 91, which recommends that sufficient at-
tention be given to the emotional needs of patients. 
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than in others, the clinics with the highest childbirth rates may 
impose stricter eligibility criteria and charge even higher fees. 
This raises yet another aspect of the present price structure that 
may operate either to exclude or include people who are other-
wise medically eligible. Among those couples who can afford to 
pay, some can afford to pay a great deal more than others. Will 
the purveyors of IVF and ET permit those who can afford a 
large number of attempts at conception as many attempts as 
they want? Will the purveyors be willing to accept a premium 
price for more attempts, or will the price be the same for all? 
How strong are the pressures for creating highly competitive 
sales of the "right" to have a child? The economic and market 
considerations that determine the capacity of childless couples 
to act on their procreative choices are troublesome because sym-
bolically, if not actually, they may commodify, and thus demean, 
the children who are the end-products of these transactions. 
Much ink has been spilled deploring the commercial aspects 
of surrogacy contracts, m while very little has been devoted to 
questioning the legitimacy of requiring payments for the techni-
cally sophisticated IVF or ET procedures. Yet, as we have just 
seen, exercising any of these choices involves going to the private 
market and paying a fee for the production of a child. Why 
should surrogacy evoke such a different response about pay-
ment? IVF and ET take place in antiseptic, clinical surround-
ings; conception occurs in a petri dish or in the reproductive sys-
tem of a carefully monitored ovum-contributor under the 
watchful eye of physicians and laboratory technicians. In con-
trast, after the artificial insemination under medical supervision 
of a surrogate gestator, the main task of baby-production occurs 
in the real world of personal and social interaction. But, in all 
these situations, a third person serves as the agent of a couple's 
reproductive efforts, and the fact that the surrogate is not sub-
ject to continuous monitoring in the laboratory should not be a 
reason to deny that she is performing a service that deserves 
compensation. If it is acceptable to pay the doctors who serve as 
surrogate fallopian tubes, or the men and women who contribute 
the genetic material in their sperm or ova, it should be equally 
acceptable to pay the woman who is contributing the temporary 
use of her womb. The payments are not to purchase a child, but 
to compensate for personal services. 
111. See, e.g., Annas & Elias, supra note 70; Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate 
Parenting, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35 (1983); WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, ch. 8 and 
part 4. 
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As we move from the question of whether there should be any 
payment to the question of how much should be paid, the qual-
ity of the experience for the different agents of reproduction be-
comes relevant. The physically and emotionally complex experi-
ence of bearing a child demands much more of the surrogate 
than does the impersonal, detached, and more circumscribed ex-
perience of the egg, embryo, or sperm donor. Precisely because 
of the demanding quality of her experience, the uterine hostess 
deserves payment for the medical and other out-of-pocket ex-
penses directly related to her pregnancy. In addition, she de-
serves compensation for the long run physical costs associated 
with childbearing and for the emotional costs of relinquishing 
the child she bears.112 Once the surrogacy route is chosen, it can 
become exploitive not because the surrogate is paid, but because 
of the risk that she will be underpaid. m 
Nonetheless, the commercial aspects of surrogacy are prob-
lematic because the technical distinction between buying a child 
and paying for personal services may obscure the fact that the 
transaction still involves the exchange of a live child for money. 
Should our principle of supporting procreative choice yield to 
the interest in protecting the welfare of a child, when a childless 
couple wants to pay not merely for "assisted" conception, as in 
IVF or ET, but for the right to raise another human being? The 
answer depends on the extent of actual "trafficking" that takes 
place. In my view, no trafficking is involved if the payment 
merely compensates for services associated with the intentional 
gestation of a particular child who will be genetically related to 
at least one of the parents who will raise her. Indeed, there are 
many precedents in which courts have honored "family com-
pacts" providing for the relinquishment of parental rights to a 
relative in exchange for a promise to support the child, or in 
exchange for a fee to the surrendering parent.114 The greater the 
112. See infra text accompanying notes 136-44 for a discussion of how the emotional 
complexities of surrogacy arrangements may affect their performance. 
113. Cf. the recognition by those who have been critical of independent adoptions 
that many birth mothers prefer to place their children independently because of assur-
. ances that they will be reimbursed for their medical and other expenses. MEEZAN. supra 
note 9, at 229. The Meezan study also recognizes that the risk of exploitation of birth 
mothers is reduced if lists of legally reimbursable expenses are established. Id. at 235. 
114. See, e.g., Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894)(upholding a promise 
by mother to relinquish custody of her son to his paternal grandfather in exchange for 
payments to her and the child as an enforceable "family compact" based on motives of 
"blood and affection"); Clark v. Clark, 122 Md. 114, 89 A. 405 (Md. Ct. App. 1913) (up-
holding promise by mother to relinquish son to the custody of his paternal grandfather 
in exchange for payments to her for her life). Similar and more recent cases are cited and 
discussed in Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L. 
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amount by which payments exceed the tangible and intangible 
costs incurred by the gestator, the less justifiable the transaction 
seems. 
A different step toward baby-selling is taken if payments dis-
proportionate to a birth mother's expenses are made in order to 
induce her to surrender a child she originally bore as the result 
of an unintended pregnancy, or to raise within her own family. 
In other words, as the payments come closer to being for the 
child herself rather than compensating for services actually per-
formed by a birth mother, the potential for commodifying babies 
becomes more real. A similar risk would be posed by IVF and 
ET if "excess" embryos were routinely frozen and auctioned off 
to the highest bidders.1111 Unlike Landes and Posner,116 I, along 
with other commentators, 117 find these prospects abhorrent. To 
diminish the danger of commodifying children, the state, or the 
private lawyers and physicians involved in noncoital reproduc-
tion, could establish a minimum and maximum range of finan-
cial compensation for these services. In surrogacy arrangements, 
it is especially important to assure that surrogates are ade-
quately compensated and that lawyer-facilitators are not 
overcompensated. 118 
3. Supporting reasonable expectations- The third compo-
nent of the goal of facilitating procreative autonomy requires 
seeking ways to assure that the reasonable expectations of the 
REP. 107 (1982). Of course, an important distinction between these custody and support 
cases and surrogacy arrangements is that the former deal with children who are already 
alive and require financial and emotional sustenance, while the latter involve payments 
to acquire a child for a potential family. Nonetheless, both kinds of transactions are 
between blood relatives of the child and presumptively benefit the child by assuring him 
or her enforceable support rights. 
115. This is to be distinguished from having an embryo bank which would be run as 
most sperm banks now operate: standard prices and some choice as to the characteristics 
of a gene donor, but not a thoroughly competitive market for genetic materials. 
116. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(1978). This is the most systematic and the most controversial defense in the current 
literature of the argument for creation of a commercial market for babies. 
117. Perhaps the most compelling critique of Landes & Posner is Prichard, A Market 
for Babies?, 34 TORONTO L.J. 341 (1984). See also Kelman, Consumption Theory, Pro-
duction Theory and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 687-88 
(1979). · 
118. As part of its supervision of the process in which the surrogate releases her pa-
rental rights to the child's genetic father and the father's wife adopts the child, the state 
could require an accounting of all expenses. While less intrusive than state-imposed price 
ceilings, this procedure would permit the adoption court to review the expenses and dis-
approve excessive amounts, and would also serve to discourage those who offer surrogacy 
services from charging whatever price desperate childless couples are willing to pay. See 
infra text accompanying notes 169-80 for a discussion of other ways the state could pro-
tect the integrity of surrogacy arrangements. 
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parties to any noncoital reproductive endeavor are fulfilled. The 
operative presumption should be that private and public regula-
tions will defer to and be consistent with the understandings 
and expectations of the parties, except in those instances where 
deference would cause specific and unacceptable harm to the 
adults or to their offspring.119 The existence of some risk of 
harm should not provide a justification for preventing noncoital 
reproduction from occurring, but rather should permit minimal 
public intervention to reduce the risk of harm, while allowing 
the basic understandings of the parties to go forward as planned. 
The following discussion will focus primarily on what the law 
can do to support and legitimate the private agreements and 
medical procedures that work, those that are performed without 
any of the participants becoming embroiled in conflict. It will 
also consider why the law has been slow to resolve legal uncer-
tainties for these "easy" cases, and what the law can do to pro-
mote the prompt resolution of the conflicts that erupt in "hard" 
cases.120 Because the legal uncertainties surrounding IVF, ET, 
and traditional AID are somewhat different than those sur-
rounding surrogacy, they will be discussed separately. 
a. Of participants in IVF, ET, and AID-
i. Establishing the legal status of offspring and parents-
The most pressing need with regard to IVF, ET, and AID is to 
clarify the legal status of the offspring of these procedures and 
of their intended parents. The allocation of parental rights and 
responsibilities cannot be accomplished exclusively through pri-
vate contracts. In the interests of assuring that children receive 
a legal identity conducive to their development of a stable 
psychosocial identity, the state must retain the final right to de-
termine which individuals may be legal parents. No principled 
reason appears for withholding the legal status of parents from 
those adults who hope to raise the offspring of IVF, ET, and 
AID. In view of the proliferation of different family forms in our 
society in recent years, we should not allow the newness of IVF 
and ET to obscure the fact that the biological and social aspects 
119. I realize that any weighing of expectations against potential harms may involve 
question begging; but as may become more clear in the discussion of how to minimize 
harms to the offspring, those harms that can be specified and anticipated can also be 
mitigated by a combination of public and private action. See infra text accompanying 
notes 186-219. Although the expectations of the adults may have to yield to some regula-
tion, there are to date no known harms so great as to justify the state in trying to pre-
vent the basic fulfillment of these expectations. 
120. At present, when disagreements arise, the intended parents may end up not with 
a baby but with a lawyer. For the rueful comments of one such father, see A Surrogate 
Mother's Story, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1983, at 76. 
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of parenting are frequently separated. From the laws governing 
adoption, paternity, custody, and even standard AID, we have 
useful precedents to guide us in crafting a set of presumptions or 
guidelines to govern the status of the parties to noncoital 
reproduction. 
Uncertainties about a child's legal identity are easiest to re-
solve in the typical IVF procedure, when the intended legal par-
ents are the genetic father and the genetic and gestational 
mother. Conception may take place in a petri dish, but the 
child's genetic and cultural heritage remain, as it were, within 
one family. The state needs no special procedures or presump-
tions to assign parental roles. Once third party sperm, egg, or 
embryo donors become involved, however, it is no longer possi-
ble for the intended rearing parents to become the child's legal 
parents without some special procedures or presumptions. About 
half the states have enacted statutory presumptions to accord 
with the parenting goals of couples who resort to traditional 
AID. 121 These statutes conclusively presume that a man who 
consents to the artificial insemination of his wife with semen 
from an anonymous donor is the legal father of any child to 
whom his wife subsequently gives birth. His wife is, of course, 
the child's legal as well as biological mother. These laws absolve 
the semen donor from any legal rights or obligations with regard 
to the child. 122 
When an unmarried woman has a child after artificial insemi-
nation with sperm from a licensed sperm bank, is the anony-
mous donor similarly exempted from any legal relationship to 
the child? Although California exempts the donor whether the 
mother is married or not, 123 most states leave this question un-
resolved. At least one commentator suggests that in order to as-
sure "equal protection" to the child of an unmarried mother, the 
child should be able to establish a legal relationship with the 
sperm donor and even hold him liable for child support. 124 No 
result would be more destructive of the reasonable expectations 
of the adult parties to artificial insemination. 1211 If we assume 
121. These statutes are listed in REP. HuM. REPROD. L. R-119 (1984). 
122. Most of the statutes have provisions similar to § 5 of the Uniform Parentage 
Act, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.] which exempts the donor from 
any legal relationship to the child of a married woman. 
123. CAL. C1v. CoDE § 7005(b) (West 1982). 
124. Comment, Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children Conceived by Artificial 
Insemination, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1061 (1984). 
125. My intuitive sense that men would not donate sperm if they thought they might 
someday be asked to assume financial or personal responsibility for the child produced 
from their genetic contribution is bolstered by the findings of the Curie-Cohen survey, 
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that the state, for practical or even for constitutional reasons, 
cannot prevent unmarried women from seeking AID,126 then the 
state should not allow the legal status of the sperm donor to de-
pend on the marital status of the recipient. The fact that the 
offspring of unmarried AID mothers will not have a legal father 
may be a reason for the state to abjure affirmative support for 
the creation of such children. But, in my view, such a harm to 
the children is not great enough to justify imposing parental re-
sponsibilities on the sperm donor, or attempts to prevent the 
mother from bearing a child. 127 
The presumptions designed for traditional AID of a married 
woman are not appropriate when third parties contribute ova or 
fertilized embryos, rather than semen, to the intended parent. 
Embryo transfers, for example, are conceptually the reverse of 
AID. The man who provides the sperm is likely to be the man 
who wants to be the child's legal father. The woman who is arti-
ficially inseminated in order to subsequently permit her fertil-
ized embryo to be transferred to the uterus of the sperm donor's 
wife does not want a legal relationship to any resulting child. 
For the first time, we face the question of who is the child's 
mother-the woman who contributes her genes or the woman 
who bears the child? The law should presumptively assign the 
status of legal parents to the uterine mother and her husband, if 
they are the intended rearing parents. The women who donate 
eggs or embryos should have no legal relationship to the off-
spring generated from their genetic contributions; nor should 
any other member of these women's families. Similar results 
should obtain if an unmarried woman receives an embryo con-
ceived from the egg and sperm of anonymous donors. The uter-
ine mother should be the legal mother and, as with AID of an 
unmarried woman, process integrity requires that the egg and 
sperm donors be exempt from any legal relationship to the 
child.128 
supra note 24, at 589. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
127. For a discussion of whether the state has any obligation to assist the offspring of 
unmarried AID mothers to deal with the psychosocial consequences of not knowing their 
genetic father, see infra text accompanying notes 212-15. 
128. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos, 14 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Feb. 1984, at 50, 50-51. Although Annas argues that the gestational mother should 
be the legal mother, he hedges in this article as well as in his other writings about how he 
thinks the law should characterize the genetic father when the gestational mother is un-
married. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 30. Concerned more with the child's interest in 
being able to claim financial support from a father than with the interest of the woman 
in bearing a child after AID, Annas is reluctant to allow parental status to be consistent 
with the expectations of sperm donors and unmarried gestational mothers. For what is in 
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Clarifying the legal family relationships of the participants in 
IVF and ET should present no great difficulties. 129 Why has no 
state done so, and why have only half the states enacted statutes 
to clarify the status of AID children? This unfortunate reluc-
tance to publicly recognize or validate noncoital reproduction 
adversely affects the interests of the offspring. Far from implic-
itly def erring to the contractual allocation of parental status, the 
lack of statutory clarification frustrates the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties. Adults and children alike are left in a legal 
limbo, not knowing precisely who they are in relation to each 
other. This leads to psychological complications that could be at 
least mitigated, if not totally averted, by stamping statutory ap-
proval on the parenting goals of those who turn to noncoital re-
production to have a child. 
ii. Establishing freedom from unnecessary physical or emo-
tional complications- Although the state can and should clar-
ify the legal status of the progeny of IVF, ET, or AID, the state 
cannot guarantee couples that they will eventually have a child 
to raise, nor that the child will meet any particular specifica-
tions. All pregnancies entail risks and those begun in a labora-
tory are no exception. Nonetheless, the childless do have reason 
to expect that the reproductive process they choose, and for 
which they are willing to pay a high financial price, will not gen-
erate so many physical or emotional problems along the way 
that the hoped-for outcome of a child no longer seems worth-
while.130 Couples may, of course, act on their own in response to 
difficulties that arise during the course of treatment. Women 
and men can decide not to go ahead with an effort to implant a 
fertilized egg, or can refuse to submit to physically invasive pro-
cedures. Until some point in their pregnancy, women can decide 
to have an abortion, or to resist efforts to diagnose or treat fetal 
abnormalities.131 
my view a much more compelling analysis of the importance of maintaining process in-
tegrity, see Blumberg, supra note 16. 
129. For a discussion of the more difficult task of clarifying the legal relationship 
between parent and child in the surrogacy context, see infra, text accompanying notes 
145-79. 
130. For an account of some recent research on how people respond to repeated fail-
ures to achieve pregnancy, see Brozan, The Grief of A Failed Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 7, 1983, at 85, col. 1. 
131. Precisely how much freedom a woman continues to have with regard to her deci-
sion to abort or to resist fetal therapy remains a matter of considerable controversy. Two 
of the most careful analyses of the conflicts between the interests of a woman and the 
interests of her unborn child are Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Ad-
vances in Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 201 {1982) 
and Robertson, supra note 41. 
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These "self-help" measures are not sufficient, however, to pro-
tect the reasonable concerns about the medical procedures en-
tailed in IVF or ET. At a minimum, the law should assure, as it 
does with other medical services, that the medical experts upon 
whom the childless rely as agents of their reproduction conform 
to acceptable standards of professional behavior. Malpractice 
claims, even though reactive rather than preventive measures, 
are available for couples who believe they have been harmed by 
negligent medical treatment. In fact, the background threat of a 
malpractice suit may serve to prevent physicians from acting im-
prudently during the course of treatment. The law should also 
see to it that the information disseminated about different tech-
niques is not false or misleading. Many commentators believe 
that the current lack of any public oversight of IVF and ET re-
search or treatment outcomes is detrimental to the legitimate 
interests of childless couples.132 State or federal statutes could 
require that prospective donors of genetic material be ade-
quately screened so couples could protect themselves and their 
offspring against physical or congenital problems. For the same 
reasons that we do not want the state to decide who is eligible 
for noncoital reproductive services, however, the state should 
not give the childless any legal right to choose donors with spe-
cific traits. Such choices, if they are to be exercised at all, should 
be made by couples and their physicians. As noted earlier,133 the 
federal government may already be involved, at least indirectly, 
in supervising IVF or ET research because of the voluntary sub-
mission of research protocols to IRBs, which are then obligated 
to protect the interests of any human subjects involved in the 
procedures. 
As with any complex and technically intricate course of medi-
cal treatment, however, a patient cannot reasonably expect to be 
in control of the process. Couples who choose to exercise their 
procreative autonomy through recourse to laboratory techniques 
must rely on the expertise of those to whom they have turned. It 
is a worthy goal to encourage medical professionals to give pri-
macy to the interests of those they treat, and to encourage pa-
tients not to believe in the infallibility of "technological fixes."134 
But the law cannot insist that doctors be continuously account-
able to patient demands for "autonomy," nor that doctors al-
ways provide unambiguous answers for those who prefer being 
132. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 6. 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06. 
134. See, e.g., the warnings in this regard in Hubbard, supra note 131. 
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more dependent on medical expertise than on their own sense of 
how treatment should proceed. Tensions between doctors and 
patients arise in the course of most complex or prolonged treat-
ments, and IVF and ET procedures are not likely to be excep-
tions to this pattern. 1311 
In sum, the law should not support the creation or attainment 
of unreasonable expectations by childless couples for specific 
outcomes from IVF, ET, or AID. But the law should be more 
actively involved in facilitating the attainment of their reason-
able procreative expectations. 
b. Of parties to surrogacy contracts- Supporting the rea-
sonable expectations of the participants in noncoital reproduc-
tion presents greater difficulties for surrogacy arrangements than 
for IVF, ET, or AID. As illustrated by the experiences of the 
biblical Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham, the interests of the uterine 
hostess are potentially at odds with the interests of the intended 
father and mother. If the contract is fully performed, the child-
less couple's interests are served by their receipt of a child to 
raise and the gestator's interests are served by her receipt of the 
payments agreed upon and, presumably, by the altruistic feel-
ings she experiences upon delivering the child to the father and 
his wife. What of the feelings of loss and sorrow that may tem-
per the altruistic rush? Recent psychological studies have begun 
to confirm what had been largely anecdotal evidence, that in 
traditional adoptions, birth mothers who relinquish an "un-
wanted" child experience for many years thereafter a persistent 
and profound sense of loss.136 This sense of loss adversely affects 
135. The dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship are themselves a fascinating 
subject of study, but beyond the scope of this paper. I do think, however, that we should 
be cautious before making assumptions that childless couples are eager to "manage" 
their treatment or, alternatively, are likely to be very deferential to medical profession-
als. An excellent general overview of the conflicts endemic to the doctor-patient relation-
ship is in E. ROBIN, MATTERS OF LIFE & DEATH: RISKS vs. BENEFITS OF MEDICAL CARE 
(1984). 
136. The first of these studies to attempt to explore the question of relinquishment 
loss in any depth is ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, chs. 4 & 13. Deykin, Campbell & 
Patti, The Postadoption Experience of Surrendering Parents, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 
271 (1984) and Rynearson, Relinquishment and its Maternal Complications, 139 AM. J. 
PsvcH. 338 (1982) both similarly report on the long term grief and sense of loss experi-
enced by relinquishing birth mothers. The most ambitious study to date, but one which 
may be of limited relevance to the arguably different social circumstances surrounding 
adoptive placements in this country, is an account of the experience of Australian birth 
mothers, R. WINKLER & M. VAN KEPPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS IN ADOPTION (1984). 
All of these studies, however, as well as the few others they cite, are retrospective and 
rely on volunteer samples, including women who respond to newspaper ads placed by the 
researchers, or women who belong to organizations whose goals are to search for previ-
ously relinquished children, or who are psychiatric patients. 
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their self-esteem and interferes with their capacity to sustain 
satisfying relationships with men and, if they have any, with 
their other children.137 We do not know what will be the experi-
ence of surrogate gestators who deliberately bear a child for 
others to raise.138 Will the ostensibly different motivation for 
producing and relinquishing a child protect them against or mit-
igate the dysfunctional effects of a long term sense of loss?139 
And what about the effect on the gestator's husband as he 
watches her bear a child for another man?140 And what about 
her other children,141 who may wonder whether they, too, will be 
pawned off to another set of parents? Although the payments 
are intended, in part, to compensate the surrogate for the emo-
tional as well as the physical consequences of her pregnancy, she 
may find that no matter how firm her resolve had been when she 
originally agreed to be inseminated, she is reluctant to relin-
quish her baby at birth.142 
i. Specifying the interests of the parties- Can the principle 
of supportive neutrality guide private intermediaries or state 
137. These findings are reported in all the studies cited supra note 136, and espe-
cially in Deykin. 
138. There is one published study of women who applied to be surrogate gestators, 
Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCH. 1 (1983). 
Some of these women indicated that they wanted to serve as surrogates in order to come 
to terms with their own unresolved feelings of grief occasioned by an earlier relinquish-
ment of a child for adoption. 
139. WINKLER & VAN KEPPEL, supra note 136, at 61-69, report that it was not the 
sense of loss by itself that adversely affected the birth mothers they studied, but the 
perceived unavailability of a social support network. Those mothers who felt that they 
had some genuine control over their decision to relinquish and who felt supported in that 
decision by friends and relatives, both at the time of relinquishment and in subsequent 
years, reported much less difficulty in dealing with their lingering sense of loss than did 
those who felt pressured into giving up their babies. 
140. Traditional AID also involves potential psychological complications for the birth 
mother's husband, including the need to come to terms with his own sterility. But at 
least the husband lives with his wife while she bears a child they both intend to raise. 
141. Most of the lawyers who have arranged surrogacy contracts insist that the surro-
gate be married, have at least one child of her own, and profess a desire not to raise any 
more children. See, e.g., KEANE & BREO, supra note 32. 
142. There are several reported instances of surrogates who have refused to deliver 
the baby to the genetic father and his wife. See, e.g., Thrane v. Noyes, 7 FAM. L. REP. 
(BNA) 2351 (Mar. 31, 1981) (permitting surrogate to retain custody of her child; denying 
genetic father visitation rights but placing his name on the child's birth certificate). See 
also the case of the British surrogate who had second thoughts about relinquishing the 
baby to the American couple who had paid her to bear a child for them, supra note 13. I 
know personally of one situation in which the surrogate and her husband already had 
several children, all girls. When, pursuant to her contract with another man, the surro-
gate gave birth to a boy, her husband at first tried to prevent her from relinquishing the 
boy to the genetic father, but later went along with her decision to abide by her contract. 
The surrogate and her husband have since had another child of their own-another 
daughter. 
SUMMER 1985] From Coitus to Commerce 903 
courts and legislatures in efforts to protect the interests of all 
parties to surrogacy agreements? There may be an unavoidable 
tilt toward according greater protection to the interests of one 
party rather than to those of another. Consider, for example, 
what is at stake in a decision about whether the surrogate and 
the intended parents ought to know each other's identity. Many 
intermediaries who have negotiated surrogacy contracts believe 
that fewer difficulties will arise during the course of performance 
if all the parties meet and maintain contact with each other. The 
parties allegedly come to appreciate each other's emotional 
needs and become highly motivated to abide by the terms of 
their contract. Some lawyers even recommend that the intended 
parents be in the delivery room when the surrogate gives birth, 
so that she can experience the joy of presenting the baby to 
them. m But there is a contrary argument that anonymity is 
preferable precisely because it prevents the surrogate from be-
coming aware of the emotions of the intended parents. Her ano-
nymity, in this view, protects her from undue pressure to fulfill 
her promise to relinquish the baby soon after giving birth. When 
she does perform her part of the agreement, her decision to do 
so will be genuinely voluntary. She will have no regrets and the 
intended parents will get the child they crave. 
This example suggests how difficult it is to determine which 
approach is "neutral"-that is, supportive of the integrity of the 
agreement without being unduly harmful to any of the parties. 
The answer depends upon which interests the law considers 
most essential to protect and upon what the law defines as 
"harm" to those interests. If the primary concern is to assure the 
outcome that the intended parents end up with a baby, then this 
interest may be harmed unless the couple has some relationship 
with the uterine hostess during her pregnancy. If the primary 
concern is to preserve the integrity of the process by assuring 
that the surrogate's consent to the original insemination and to 
the subsequent relinquishment is voluntary, then this interest 
may be harmed unless anonymity is maintained. Because, how-
ever, anonymity may in fact serve both the outcome interest and 
the process interest, or may in fact serve neither interest, we are 
unable to define it as a "harm" or as a "benefit." It is probably 
best for the law not to formulate any presumption with regard 
to anonymity, but to defer to the approach that makes the par-
ties feel most comfortable. 144 
143. Handel, supra note 22. 
144. Research on surrogacy arrangements may eventually show that those in which 
904 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
ii. The indeterminacy of prevailing contract and family law 
principles- An even more difficult test for the principle of sup-
portive neutrality arises when the law must take sides, as, for 
example, when the birth mother refuses to turn the child over to 
the father and his wife. This situation does not involve a poten-
tial clash between an outcome concern and a process concern, 
but a clash between two outcomes, one initially agreed upon and 
the other developing as a consequence of the surrogate's experi-
ence bearing the child. Will the emotional harm now claimed by 
the surrogate if she is required to relinquish the child be allowed 
to vitiate the expectations of the intended parents? Since a deci-
sion either way will also determine who is to raise the child, how 
are the child's interests to be weighed as against those of the 
competing adults? Prevailing contract and family law principles 
probably could not yield predictable results in the dual effort to 
resolve the dispute between the adults and to protect the inter-
ests of the child. 145 As a consequence, time-consuming, expensive 
litigation would be required to resolve the matter. All partici-
pants are thus harmed by the lack of an explicit principle of 
support for noncoital reproduction. 
Consider the numerous ways in which the intended parents' 
breach of contract claim against the surrogate might be resolved. 
The court might initially declare the contract unenforceable as a 
violation of state laws against baby-selling.146 In this event, the 
infant would remain with the surrogate, but the genetic father 
would be unable to sue for damages or other relief, and the par-
ticipants in the surrogacy arrangement, including the lawyers, 
might be subject to criminal penalties.147 If the court did not 
find the contract unenforceable, it might award the father and 
the parties meet each other and have some kind of personal relationship are the ones 
that have the fewest conflicts about outcome or process. Even then a state legislature 
could justifiably be reluctant to make such contact mandatory. But it might be less hesi-
tant to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the parties learning each other's iden-
tity. This discussion of anonymity between surrogates and intended parents is not con-
clusive for, and may not even be pertinent to, an analysis of the child's interest in 
knowing the identity of her birth mother. For such an analysis, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 218-19. 
145. For the clearest analysis of how judges who decide child custody disputes must 
perform the dual and often inconsistent functions of settling the private dispute between 
the adult contestants and serving the societal interest in the welfare of the child, see 
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indetermi-
nacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975). 
146. See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1183 (1983), where the Michigan Court of Appeals did declare the con-
tract unenforceable as violating state law against baby-selling. 
147. See supra note 9. 
SUMMER 1985] From Coitus to Commerce 905 
his wife restitution of any sums already paid to the surrogate 
and reimbursement of their reasonable reliance expenses. But 
these would-be parents want their expectancy interest: specific 
enforcement of the surrogate's promises to relinquish her paren-
tal rights to the father, and to consent to the child's adoption by 
the father's wife. The court might decline this prayer for relief, 
invoking the law's traditional reluctance to order specific en-
forcement of personal service contracts, and, instead, might per-
mit the surrogate to retain the child, while ordering her to pay 
damages to the couple to compensate for the loss of their ex-
pected child. The court might also relieve the father of any obli-
gation to support the child, especially if the surrogate's husband 
were willing to assume that obligation, or were deemed the 
child's legal father by the statutory presumption designed for 
AID children. 148 If the court felt that money could not ade-
quately compensate the couple for the emotional damage occa-
sioned by the loss of "their" child, 149 it could order the surrogate 
to relinquish the child in exchange for the payments originally 
promised her. 1110 
Because the dispute involves the fate of a child who was not a 
party to the contract, the court might find it inappropriate to 
limit its decision to the issues posed by breach of a purely com-
mercial transaction. Assessment of the claim for specific relief 
would be tempered by the concern for the child's welfare. With 
this in mind, the couple might recast their request in family law 
terms, as a claim for the permanent custody of the child based 
on the contractual agreement to give custody to the couple and 
on the alleged best interests of the child (BIC). m Specific en-
forcement of custody agreements is not uncommon, but courts 
subject the request to a review under the custody standards that 
would operate in a particular jurisdiction in the absence of such 
an agreement. 1112 It is also possible that the surrogate would con-
148. U.P.A., supra note 122, § 5. 
149. Cf. the "unique goods" exception to the general principle of not awarding equi-
table relief for contract breach. 
150. For alternative scenarios that might occur in the event of a dispute between the 
surrogate and the intended parents, see Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous, 
and Other Legal Strangers, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 383 (1984); Rushevsky, supra note 114; 
Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CAL. L. REV. 611 (1978). My own version is not 
intended to consider all plausible possibilities, but merely to suggest how broad the 
range of possibilities is, and how difficult it is to predict in advance how our hypothetical 
dispute would be resolved. 
151. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND D1voRcE ACT § 409, 9A U.L.A. 91, 211 (1979 and 
Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as U.M.D.A.]. 
152. In many cases, such a review is pro forma, or the challenger bears a heavy bur-
den of persuasion that such enforcement would be detrimental to the child. However, in 
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vince the court that the critical issue is not enforcing the origi-
nal contract, but dealing with her request for "modification" 
based on the alleged "change of circumstances"-the profound 
changes in her feelings about the child during the course of her 
pregnancy.153 Under either characterization of the is-
sue-contract enforcement or modification-the court is likely 
to apply some version of the typical BIC standard. 
Under the BIC, neither the genetic mother nor the genetic fa-
ther is obviously "best" as a potential nurturing parent. If the 
court felt that the mother's "moral fitness" was tainted by her 
refusal to perform the contract, 154 the BIC standard might help 
the couple. Even then, the surrogate could respond by noting 
first, that her conduct in commercial transactions is not relevant 
to her fitness as a parent, and second, that she broke the con-
tract for the sake of the infant, in order to assure the infant an 
opportunity to be raised by a mother in whom the genetic, gesta-
tional and rearing roles were united. If the court applied a 
tender years155 or primary caretaker156 presumption, the surro-
gate would prevail. The surrogate might similarly have an edge 
if the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit (GFS) standards were in-
voked,157 because her experience as child-bearer may establish 
her as the only contestant with at least an incipient psychologi-
cal parenting relationship with the child. If the mother contin-
ued to care for the child after birth during the pendency of the 
dispute, her GFS-based argument would be stronger. 
If the court looked for the parent more likely to encourage 
"frequent and continuing contact" between the child and the 
non-custodial parent,158 neither one would be appropriate. If the 
unusual circumstances like the ones presented by our hypothetical, the court is more 
likely to perform an independent assessment under the jurisdiction's general custody 
standards; see, e.g., Gruber v. Gruber, 87 A.D.2d 246, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1982) (ordering 
a father to abide by an agreement to keep his children in a religious school through the 
12th grade after he failed to show that following the "crystal clear" terms of the marital 
separation agreement would be detrimental to his children). 
153. This requires some stretching of the meaning of "modification," which usually 
requires that there be a pre-existing custody decree; see, e.g., U.M.D.A., supra note 151, 
§ 409. 
154. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.23(3)(0 (1979). 
155. See generally, Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 
335 (1982). 
156. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). 
157. GFS, supra note 55, at 97-101. 
158. For example, California is one of a growing number of states to give preference 
to the so-called "friendlier parent," the one more likely to allow the maintenance of a 
continuing relationship with the non-custodial parent, in the event that the primary stat-
utory preference for joint custody cannot be applied. CAL. Civ. CooE § 4600(b) (Deering 
1983). I have not even considered the possibility of using the fashionable preference for 
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court were required to give weight to the commitment of the 
parties to parenting, 1119 the father's prospective loss of his oppor-
tunity to raise his child might weigh heavily against the court's 
reluctance to award custody of a newborn to anyone other than 
the birth mother. Similarly, if the court viewed the father's wife 
as sharing his strong reliance interest in parenting, then it might 
conclude that fairness dictated an award of custody to the father 
and his wife, even though the wife would normally not be able to 
prevail in a dispute against a biological parent. 160 In sum, even 
though in a number of jurisdictions the financial or custodial 
provisions of the contract might be presumptively valid, the 
court might or might not conclude, after reviewing the evidence, 
that the child's interests would be threatened by specific en-
forcement. 161 And if the court had initially determined that the 
surrogacy contract was unenforceable, the custody dispute would 
be resolved with even less attention to the parties' original 
expectations. 
Regardless of how the custody determination turned out, the 
court would still have to decide whether to enforce the surro-
gate's promise to consent to the child's adoption by the father's 
wife. Here, the solicitude that courts and legislatures have 
shown to the right of birth mothers to withhold or revoke their 
consent to adoption162 would have to be balanced against the 
joint custody, since our hypothetical is clearly not conducive to the harmonious sharing 
of custodial responsibilities. One of the best analyses, to date, of joint legal and physical 
custody is Scott & Derdyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 455 (1984). 
159. Under current family law principles, courts are typically not required to do this, 
although many judges implicitly take the interests of the adults into account in applying 
a BIC standard. For an interesting argument that courts should take into account the 
interests and expectations of the adults, see Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive 
Rules for Child Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984). 
160. This is because of the typical statutory requirement that in a dispute between a 
parent and a third party, the BIC of the child is served by awarding custody to the 
parent, "unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence," MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 722.25.5 (1979); or unless the third party can show that an award to the 
parent "would be detrimental" to the child and an award to the third party is "required" 
to serve the BIC, CAL. C1v. CooE § 4600(c) (Deering 1983). 
161. If the court decided that the couple should get custody, it would probably char-
acterize the decision as a "custody award" and not as "specific relief," in order to avoid 
the appearance-symbolically-of ordering the surrogate to perform an objectionable 
personal act. Whatever the terminology, the result would in fact be that the father and 
his wife would end up with the child. 
162. See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 
N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971), in which a birth mother who claimed that she was 
pressured into consenting to her daughter's adoption was allowed to revoke her consent 
even though the child had already been placed with prospective adoptive parents. The 
birth mother did not regain her child, however, because the adoptive parents fled to 
Florida where a local court later denied the birth mother's request for habeas corpus. 
Foster, Adoption and Child Custody, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1972). See also, Sims v. 
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claims of the father and his wife that the child's best interests 
necessitated enforcement of the gestator's promise.163 Because 
consent was given even before the child was conceived, 164 and 
because the birth mother probably would revoke it while the in-
fant remained in her possession, 165 the court would have to be 
very strongly committed to serving the parenting interests of the 
prospective adoptive mother before it would seriously entertain 
her request for specific enforcement of the adoption promise. 
If the adoption does not take place, the genetic father and his 
wife could end up with custody of the child, but subject to visi-
tation by the surrogate gestator. If the surrogate prevailed on 
the custody dispute, she could end up with custody of the child, 
but subject to visitation by the genetic father and his wife. Con-
flicts over child support would persist. The arrangement would 
take on the characteristics of many of the blended families that 
now come into existence when divorced parents, who share legal 
and physical custody of their child, each remarry. The child's 
stepparents, who may in fact give the child both emotional and 
financial sustenance, acquire at most an ambiguous legal rela-
tionship to the child.166 Parents who choose to divorce have con-
siderable control over the consequences of that decision for their 
children as well as for themselves. This is because the law, albeit 
indeterminate on many issues if the parties disagree, generally 
Sims, 30 Ill. App. 3d 406, 332 N.E.2d 36 (1975). The range of different statutory consent 
provisions is summarized in MEEZAN, supra note 9, at 154-64. Most states impose some 
kind of time limit within which a revocation must be made. Id. 
163. A handful of states have incorporated the BIC question into their consent to 
adoption statutes. This includes New York where, subsequent to Scarpetta v. Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971), the leg-
islature enacted a provision which in some circumstances makes it easier for prospective 
adoptive parents to invoke the BIC standard to enforce a birth mother's consent to relin-
quish her child. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(d)(ii),(iii),(iv). For a persuasive criticism 
of this statutory change as being insufficiently protective of the interests of birth 
mothers in traditional adoptions, see Note, The Constitutional Rights of Natural Par-
ents Under New York's Adoption Statutes, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 617 (1983-
84). Although a number of states seem to have case law precedents for refusing to allow 
birth mothers to revoke adoption consents, the variation in the standards is so great that 
I find it impossible to extrapolate a general rule. 
164. Many statutes provide that a consent to adoption signed before birth cannot 
become irrevocable until some time after the child is actually born or, alternatively, that 
no matter when a consent is given, it can be withdrawn at any time prior to placement 
with the adoptive parents or prior to the entry of the adoption decree. See MEEZAN, 
supra note 9, at 154-64. 
165. This, of course, makes it difficult for the prospective adoptive mother to argue 
that she rather than the birth mother has established an emotional bond with the infant. 
166. See generally, Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent· 
Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38 (1984). 
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supports and enforces their private agreements. 167 Parties who 
choose to enter surrogacy agreements have considerably less 
control over the consequences of their decision. The law is not 
only indeterminate when a dispute arises, as we have just 
seen, 168 it is also indeterminate when the parties agree. Surely 
the law owes at least as much protection to the private under-
standings of those who hope to create families as to those who 
are breaking them apart. Unguided by an explicit principle of 
support for this kind of procreative choice, courts and legisla-
tures are preventing childless couples from making reasonable 
plans for child rearing, and subjecting children to persistently 
unresolved questions about who is responsible for raising them. 
m. Justifying a presumption for enforcing surrogacy con-
tracts- To avoid these harms, contract and family law princi-
ples should be combined into a strong statutory presumption in 
favor of enforcing the terms of the private surrogacy contract, 
including the provisions governing the relinquishment of the 
child to the father and the consent to the adoption of the child 
by the father's wife. Any party who challenged the agreement 
should have to show by clear and convincing evidence either 
that the agreement was not freely and knowingly entered into, 169 
or that full and specific enforcement would be detrimental to the 
child. The presumption would thus favor the intended parents' 
interests in the event of a breach by the surrogate, and the sur-
rogate's interests in the event of a breach by the genetic father. 
A strong presumption in favor of enforcement is warranted for 
a number of reasons. First, because there is no way to anticipate 
whether a child will be better off being raised by his birth 
mother and her husband or by his genetic father and his wife, 
the child is not harmed by a presumptive allocation to the father 
in accord with the basic intention of the surrogacy contract. Sec-
ond, placing a burden on those who would challenge the enforce-
ment of rights and responsibilities allocated voluntarily, rather 
than on those who desire such enforcement, conforms with our 
general social, if not full constitutional, support for privately de-
167. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 11; Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Lim-
its on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015 {1985). 
168. Our discussion of what might occur if the law has to take sides when a surrogate 
decides that she does not want to relinquish the child suggests only a few of the legal 
uncertainties surrounding these reproductive choices. Many others would become mani-
fest if we were to explore the consequences of a genetic father's breach of the contract 
terms, by refusing, for example, to accept the child or by refusing to make the promised 
payments. 
169. This would serve the process concern of protecting the surrogate against undue 
pressure to enter the agreement in the first instance. 
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termined reproductive choices. Third, this presumption would 
make it considerably easier than it now is for the parties to a 
surrogacy arrangement that goes smoothly to obtain legal and 
public validation of their private conduct. Those who under-
stand what they are doing, and do it without harming either 
each other or their offspring, should not have to go to court to 
fight for a sympathetic interpretation of their activities. Fourth, 
the existence of this presumption would encourage people to re-
flect carefully upon the consequences of a surrogacy contract 
before entering into one, and discourage them from initiating lit-
igation to set aside such agreements once performance has be-
gun. Given the special importance of avoiding the harms to chil-
dren occasioned by protracted custody litigation,170 there is 
much to be said for a presumption designed to narrow the 
boundaries within which legal indeterminacy exists. For the sake 
of the child who is bound to be harmed by not having a clear 
location in which to experience her infancy, we should not wait 
for the majesty of the law to gradually and inconsistently mani-
fest itself through a series of ad hoc decisions. Legislative action 
is needed now.171 
Legislation designed to presume and facilitate enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts must, of course, ensure that both the negoti-
ation and the performance of the contract conform to at least 
minimal standards of fairness. The state should require, for ex-
ample, that the agreement be in writing, that the surrogate and 
the intended parents offer evidence of the knowing and volun-
tary nature of their consent, such as being represented by sepa-
rate counsel,172 and that any party be permitted to cancel the 
agreement without penalty prior to the insemination of the 
surrogate. 
The state should also insist that specific terms be included to 
enhance the possibility that the parties will end up with the out-
come they desire. Contracts routinely should provide for medical 
and genetic screening of the surrogate and the intended father 
to protect the surrogate against infections transmitted by the fa-
ther's sperm and the child against inheritable illnesses or other 
congenital disabilities. The surrogate should agree to abide by 
explicit instructions from her physician to refrain from regular 
170. GFS, supra note 55, ch.3. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29 for the similar argument for clarify-
ing the legal relationship among the parties to IVF, ET, and traditional AID. 
172. See, e.g., the recommendation of the Committee on Judicial Ethics of the New 
York City Bar Association with regard to separate attorneys for the surrogate and the 
couple, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4069 (1982). 
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sexual intercourse while trying to achieve a pregnancy through 
artificial insemination. Contracts also should call for blood tests 
to determine paternity after the surroga.te gives birth.173 Escrow 
accounts or insurance policies174 are needed to guarantee that 
the promised payments are made, including, for example, partial 
payment to the surrogate if she miscarries or if other unantici-
pated medical complications prevent her from carrying the baby 
to term.1711 
Additional legislation may be needed to facilitate, first, the ac-
knowledgment of the genetic father's paternity, second, the re-
linquishment of the surrogate's parental rights to the genetic fa-
ther, and third, the adoption of the child by the father's wife. 
Some might argue that the surrogate's relinquishing of parental 
rights to the child's father is the equivalent of her consent to the 
child's adoption by another woman. I think the integrity of the 
entire process is better served by separating the relinquishing of 
parental rights, which might be interpreted in some jurisdictions 
as not being broad enough to encompass a general consent to 
adoption, from the surrogate's consent to the specific adoption 
by the father's wife. Alternatively, this could be accomplished in 
one judicial proceeding in which the surrogate submitted her 
written consent relinquishing all parental rights to the father, 
including the right to place the child for adoption. 176 At this pro-
173. As many commentators have noted, such requirements could have averted the 
Malahoff-Stiver fiasco in which the fate of the microcephalic child borne by the surro-
gate remained uncertain because of a dispute-over his genetic parentage. Blood test re-
sults, read on the Donahue show, eventually indicated that the child was the son of the 
surrogate and her own husband. See, Annas & Elias, supra note 70, at 217. 
174. The parties will probably agree to have such accounts or policies in order to 
support the child in the event that the father dies or refuses to accept custody. But since 
the state does not require that the children generated by coital means be similarly pro-
tected in the event one or both parents die or abandon them, I do not believe such a 
requirement can be mandated in the surrogacy context. 
175. She should not get paid, however, if she decides to have an abortion, unless she 
does so with the consent of the genetic father after learning, for example, from amni-
ocentesis, that the fetus is not developing normally. She should also not get paid if her 
own negligence results in the loss of the fetus. Frankly, I am undecided as to whether the 
state should by statute limit the father's recovery against the surrogate to return of his 
payments, in the event that her provable neligence results either in the loss of or physi-
cal harm to the baby. Perhaps this question, as well as the question of specific enforce-
ment of any promises made by the surrogate with regard to prenatal care, ought to be 
resolved by the courts in what I hope will be very few such cases. 
176. I am not addressing here the possibility that the father's wife will refuse to 
adopt the child, or that the father will refuse to give his consent to the adoption because, 
for example, he and his wife are estranged. Would the surrogate be held to her relin-
quishment of parental rights to the father even if the adoption does not take place? I 
would stand by my proposed presumption of enforceability of the promise to relinquish, 
in part because it is by no means clear that the child would be harmed if raised exclu-
sively by his or her father. 
912 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
ceeding, the court could scrutinize the consent to be sure it con-
formed to the proposed standard of being informed and volun-
tary, 177 and could ask for an accounting of all moneys paid to the 
surrogate and to the attorneys. 
Legislation should recognize the legitimacy of the payments 
discussed earlier,178 and should specifically exempt the kind of 
surrogacy agreement described here from state statutes prohibit-
ing "baby-selling." As a final protection of the integrity of the 
process, the state could insist on a minimal social investigation 
of the adoptive mother, analogous to what might be done in a 
routine stepparent adoption. 179 The scope of this inquiry should 
be carefully limited to any characteristics that might threaten 
the child's welfare, and should not include any futile attempt to 
determine if the adoptive mother is the "best" possible parent 
for the child. Indeed, counseling services for the father and the 
adoptive mother, to assist them with any problems they antici-
pate in raising the child, would be more consistent with the pro-
cedures outlined here than would any general investigation of 
the suitability of either one of them as parents. But I doubt that 
any state would be willing to allow its courts to approve the 
adoption without some inquiry into the setting in which the 
child will probably be raised. At the end of this process, the sur-
rogate gestator would have no legal rights or responsibilities to 
the child, who· would then reside with her legal parents-her ge-
netic father and his wife. 
My aim, in outlining some of these procedural and legislative 
measures, has been to show that my proposed presumption in 
favor of enforcing surrogacy contracts can be achieved without 
creating an elaborate administrative or supervisory structure. I 
explicitly disagree, for example, with Walter Wadlington's sug-
gestion that the model of traditional adoption with its "networks 
of child placement agencies operated or regulated by the 
states,"180 is an appropriate model for supervising surrogacy con-
tracts. As my proposals indicate, I do recognize that some public 
oversight is necessary. But the goal of any public regulation 
must always be to protect the interests of all parties by allowing, 
177. If the parties had previously determined that they wished to retain anonymity 
among themselves, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text, this desire could be 
honored by having the court question the birth mother separately, or by waiving any 
requirement that she appear in person. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18. 
179. The interest in protecting the child's welfare does not, in my view, require an 
elaborate investigation of the intended parents any earlier in the process. For my skepti-
cism about screening for parental fitness, see supra text accompanying notes 98-106. 
180. Wadlington, supra note 23, at 512. 
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to the greatest extent possible, the parties to define those inter-
ests for themselves. 
The social and psychological complexities of surrogacy,181 in 
addition to its legal ambiguities and commercial aspects, may 
present good reasons for people not to choose this procreative 
option. These concerns.certainly account for the hostility toward 
surrogacy expressed by the medical profession and by most as-
sociations of adoption and child welfare agencies. 182 The current 
efforts in Britain and Australia to criminalize commercial surro-
gacy are similarly responsive to these concerns.183 Surrogacy is 
also distasteful to those feminists who are eager to eliminate the 
perception and use of women exclusively as child bearers. Those 
sharing this perspective see the childless man exercising a form 
of "patriarchal genetics" over the woman whose gestational ser-
vices he hires, 184 as well as over his wife, who, if the typical pat-
tern holds, is more likely than he to assume the major responsi-
bility for the infant's care. For other feminists, however, who 
glorify the role of woman as child bearer and nurturer,185 surro-
gacy may be the apotheosis of the ethos of care among women. 
My own position on surrogacy is, as suggested throughout this 
discussion, that it is extemely difficult to make an informed and 
knowing decision to pursue a procreative choice that has so 
many indeterminate psychological consequences. Nonetheless, in 
the absence of a showing of specific and substantial harm to the 
offspring, I do not believe the law should stand in the way of 
those who determine that this is the most appropriate choice for 
them. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 136-44. 
182. See, e.g., the critical statement of the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) (May 1983), reprinted in 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31 (1983). See 
also the AMA Resolution criticizing surrogacy arrangements as not serving societal inter-
ests, reported in REP. HuM. REPROD. L. R-114 (1984); and the recommendation by the 
Child Welfare League of America and the National Committee for Adoption (NCFA) 
that adoption agencies refuse to cooperate with any surrogacy arrangements and that 
legislation be enacted to outlaw these arrangements, reported in Pierce, supra note 66, at 
3002. 
183. WARNOCK REP., supra note 14, §§ 8.17-8.18: "That people should treat others as 
a means to their own ends, however desirable the consequences, must always be liable to 
moral objections. . . . [T)here is a serious risk of commercial exploitation of surrogacy 
... that ... would be difficult to prevent without the assistance of the criminal Jaw." 
See also WALLER REP., supra note 14, part 4. 
184. See, e.g., Blakely, Surrogate Mothers: For Whom Are they Working, Ms., Mar. 
1983, at 18. 
185. From his interviews of women who wished to be surrogates, Parker, supra note 
138, reported that many of these women experienced a strong emotional desire to bestow 
"the gift of life" on childless women. 
914 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
B. Minimizing Harm, Especially to the Children 
What about the children who are the end product of the new 
conception techniques? To remain consistent with the principle 
of supportive neutrality, the state's policies for facilitating pro-
creative choice must yield at some point to the newborn's inter-
est in avoiding harm.186 In defining the parameters of the child's 
interest, three questions need to be addressed. Should special 
attention be afforded the products of assisted fertilization? Can 
the kinds of harms that might befall these children be antici-
pated? What might be done to minimize the likelihood that 
these harms will occur? 
No one stands at the bedside of the couple who are attempt-
ing to conceive a child through coital means to ask whether they 
have taken appropriate steps to protect their offspring against 
physical or emotional harms. Why should the children produced 
by noncoital means receive special treatment? With other chil-
dren, we defer to parental autonomy until some actual danger 
looms against which the parents are by themselves unable to 
shield their children, or for which the parents themselves are re-
sponsible. Why should it be different here? The grounds for 
some early "protection" are clear. As discussed earlier, the ab-
sence of some state action identifying the legal parents may 
leave children vulnerable to harm resulting from being the ob-
ject of litigation, as well as from the lack of stability that inheres 
in not knowing precisely who one's parents are.187 The very pro-
cess by which these children are created may be more physically 
harmful or dangerous than conventional conception and birth. 
Finally, the specific psychosocial harms that may reasonably be 
anticipated to threaten these children over the course of their 
lives might actually be averted or mitigated by supplementing 
the self-interested actions of the adult participants in noncoital 
reproduction with some publicly-imposed preventive measures. 
1. Threats to physical well-being- Is there any evidence 
that the new reproductive techniques jeopardize the physical 
well-being of the offspring? The artificial in vivo insemination of 
a surrogate gestator with the sperm of the intended father 
presents no more chance that the child will be born with physi-
cal or congenital disabilities than what would be anticipated 
from the usual process of conception and gestation.188 The 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
187. See supra ·text accompanying notes 121-29 and 145-68. 
188. Artificial insemination is a simple procedure, requiring no surgery and no medi-
SUMMER 1985) From Coitus to Commerce 915 
chances may even be lower because the medical and genetic his-
tories of both the sperm-provider and the uterine hostess would 
presumably be thoroughly reviewed and "approved" before the 
artificial insemination takes place.189 Also, the promise of pay-
ment upon her delivery of a newborn may encourage the surro-
gate to give the child especially attentive prenatal care. 
In contrast to the surrogacy situation, the risks of physical 
harm to a child from being fertilized in a petri dish may be 
somewhat higher, or at least of a different kind. Although many 
medical groups are convinced that IVF is safe, 100 questions re-
main about the unknown and still unknowable long term conse-
quences of being conceived outside a womb. Biomedical research 
has taught us a great deal about the growth and development of 
embryos. Nonetheless, we still lack complete understanding of 
this extraordinarily complex process. Similarly, our knowledge of 
what accounts for the successful implantation of a fertilized em-
bryo within a woman's uterus remains incomplete. Many inter-
related processes occur at the same time. If anything goes awry, 
the consequences could occur at once and the embryo could 
abort itself, as indeed happens in many "natural" conceptions. 
But the difficulties could also appear years later in unexpected 
and catastrophic ways.191 
There is a somewhat greater than average likelihood of multi-
ple births after IVF, along with their predictable concomitants: 
premature labor, low birth weights, and caesarean delivery. This 
is not due to the in .vitro fertilization itself, but to the currently 
cation, that can be performed in a doctor's office or in an outpatient hospital clinic, 
FINEGOLD, supra note 23. We are assuming that the AID of surrogates will be performed 
by licensed physicians and not, as of course can be done, by the parties themselves. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33 for the suggestion that the state re-
quire the routine use of the most up-to-date diagnostic and genetic screening tests for 
the surrogate and the genetic father prior to the insemination. This is not intended to 
prevent the surrogacy agreement from going forward if the tests indicated some height-
ened degree of risk to the child, but to make the information available to inform 
whatever decisions the adults make. For example, if the tests reveal that the child is 
likely to have cystic fibrosis, the state cannot prevent the adults from proceeding as 
planned, but they themselves might decide not to proceed. 
190. AFS Statement, supra note 91. Much of the information, as well as the ques-
tions raised, in this and the following paragraph are drawn from recent articles in FER-
TILITY & STERILITY or J.A.M.A., from IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 
supra note 91, and from my discussions with members of the Stanford Medical School 
faculty. 
191. Much of this would also apply to donor embryo transfer. Although fertilization 
in the ET procedure takes place in vivo, our knowledge about the consequences of trans-
ferring an embryo from one reproductive environment to another is still derived largely 
from cattle and other aninmal breeding. Brotman, supra note 29; Buster interview, 
supra note 29. 
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preferred procedures of giving the uterine mother superovula-
tion drugs prior to retrieving her eggs, and then implanting sev-
eral fertilized embryos simultaneously to improve the chances of 
at least one successful implantation. No one has suggested that a 
high occurrence of multiple births is an unacceptable "harm"; 
indeed, some would say it is a benefit both to the parents who 
get an unbargained-for windfall and to the children who get sib-
lings they might not otherwise have. Similarly, no one has 
claimed that any of the children born thus far as a consequence 
of IVF show signs of unusual physical or mental disabilities. 
Nonetheless, the oldest of the test tube babies is only seven-and-
one-half-years-old. How long should we wait before we can feel 
comfortable about saying that the risks to children from IVF are 
no more or less than the risks from normal conception?192 
More importantly, how substantial would the risks from IVF 
have to be before we would feel comfortable arguing for its pro-
hibition? And who are "we": prospective parents choosing be-
tween having no child and having a child who, however "dam-
aged," is genetically related to at least one of us; doctors 
deciding whether it is worth our time to attempt to improve IVF 
outcomes or to explore other infertility treatments; or the fed-
eral or state governments choosing between commitment to pro-
creative autonomy for adults and responsibility to protect the 
welfare of children? In other words, "we" might include every-
one except the child, who is not in existence and therefore can-
not tell us whether he or she would prefer some life to no life at 
all. The law must of necessity entrust the fate of the unborn 
child to others. Perhaps equally inescapable is the difficulty of 
preventing the interests of adults from always getting primacy 
over the interests of children. 
2. Threats to psychological well-being- This last observa-
tion may be of even greater relevance for an analysis of potential 
psychosocial harms to the children produced by noncoital means 
192. Our experience with other medical procedures or treatments that have resulted 
in unanticipated and severe physical harm certainly argues for some caution when the 
creation of human life is involved. Consider such examples as the doubling of the inci-
dence of uterine cancer in the 1970's, which has now been attributed to the widespread 
use in the previous decade of estrogen therapy for post-menopausal women; the inaccu-
rate diagnoses of pulmonary embolism resulting from the use of inadequately tested lung 
scanners; past epidemics of blindness among premature newborns resulting from exces-
sively high exposure to oxygen while in neonatal intensive care units; the second 
thoughts now beginning to emerge about the superiority of radical mastectomy for 
women with breast cancer as opposed to the less physically invasive and disfiguring ap-
proach of limited lumpectomy. These and other examples of medical practices which 
became routine without adequate studies to test their efficacy and safety are discussed in 
E. ROBIN, supra note 135, at ch. 8. 
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than for a discussion of physical harms. Consider what would 
happen if IVF or ET offspring were suddenly to manifest serious 
physical problems; being born, for example, with some fatal dis-
ease. This would probably not result in a clash between childless 
couples and a paternalistic legislature or court. Instead, all par-
ties would quickly come to a consensus to abandon these 
procedures. 193 
In contrast, conflicts between the interests of children and the 
interests of adults might well arise once attention shifts to the 
much more elusive realm of psychosocial harms. The state may 
then have to be enlisted to act on behalf of the children. Al-
though more difficult to specify than physical harms, 
psychosocial harms are no less real. Those harms most likely to 
threaten the offspring of noncoital reproduction resemble the 
genealogical bewilderment that many adopted children experi-
ence: confusion about the circumstances of their birth, difficul-
ties with identity formation, and desires to be reconnected to 
their apparently lost genetic heritage.194 It is not abnormal to be 
curious about one's origins; indeed, such curiosity is generally 
recognized as a healthy and predictable part of growing up. In 
recent years, adoptees who seek information about their biologi-
cal parents have been treated more sympathetically; they are no 
longer seen as obsessive or weird. 195 Erikson and Lifton are 
among those who argue that identity formation does require 
some awareness of one's biological and historical past. 196 
a. Whether to reveal the child's origins- Secrecy has been 
193. I doubt whether even those who believe that it is better to be born with handi-
caps than not to be born at all would argue that it is better to be born in order to die an 
early and painful death than not to be born at all, especially if other less dangerous 
routes to conception could be devised. But for an argument that comes close to the posi-
tion that any life, no matter what its quality, is better than no life at all, see Robertson, 
In Vitro Conception and Harm to the Unborn, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1979, at 
13. 
194. For a general overview of the psychological problems adopted children confront, 
see American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Adoptions, Identity Development in 
Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948 (1971); Schwam & Tuskan, The Adopted Child, in 
1 BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 342 (J. Noshpitz ed. 1979). For useful bibliogra-
phies of the many published and unpublished papers on this subject see AooPrION TRI-
ANGLE, supra note 99; W. FEIGELMAN & A SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN (1983)[hereinaf-
ter cited as CHOSEN CHILDREN]. 
195. The research on searching and on reunions between adoptees and birth parents 
reported in ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, has had a lot to do with changing atti-
tudes toward adoptees who manifest curiosity about their biological roots. See also CHO• 
SEN CHILDREN, supra note 194, at ch. 8; JONES, THE SEALED AooPrION RECORD CONTRO· 
VERSY: A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINIONS (1976). 
196. E. ERIKSON, LIFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORICAL MOMENT (1975); R. LIFTON, THE 
LIFE OF THE SELF: TOWARD NEW PSYCHOLOGY (1976). 
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an element in adoption since the 1920's, 197 but it need not be 
carried over into other child rearing arrangements that involve a 
separation of biological from social parenting. Even in the case 
of adoption, informed opinion during the last several decades 
has overwhelmingly favored sharing with the child the· fact that 
he or she has been adopted.198 The offspring of noncoital repro-
duction ought to be told the circumstances of their birth. Even if 
the parents do not display a bronzed petri dish on their mantle, 
it is difficult to imagine that the circumstances of artificial con-
ception could be kept from a child forever. Children are bound 
to experience more distress if they learn about these circum-
stances inadvertently than if their parents tell them. Adoptees 
who feel the greatest need to search for their biological parents, 
and who often experience other kinds of psychological stress, are 
those who learn of their status when they are older or who are 
told, not by their adoptive parents, but by others.199 Nothing is 
gained by non-disclosure. The energies that go into maintaining 
the "family secret" undermine the long term development of a 
trusting relationship between the child and the parents who 
raise her.200 There are reasons to believe, then, that similar dis-
tress and intra-family difficulties will afflict the offspring of IVF, 
ET, AID, and surrogacy if they are kept in the dark about the 
nature of their conception. 
Assuming that it is better to tell than not to tell, can disclo-
197. E.g., New York State explicitly recognized in 1924 that the judge who granted 
an adoption had the discretionary power to seal the records of an adoption proceeding. 
1924 New York Laws ch. 323, § 113. But New York, like most other states, did not 
mandate the sealing of adoption records until at least the mid-1930's. See 1935 New 
York Laws ch. 860, § 113. See generally Hollinger, The Search for the Ideal Home: 
Adoption in America, 1900-1935 (paper prepared for University of Wisconsin Legal His-
tory Project, summer 1984; copy on file with the U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
198. CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 194; CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STAN-
DARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE § 4.20 (rev. ed 1978) [hereinafter cited as CWLA STAN-
DARDS). See also Dukette, Value Issues in Present-Day Adoption, 63 CHILD WELFARE 
233 (1984). 
199. See generally ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, and CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra 
note 194. 
200. Sands & Rothenberg, Adoption in 1976: Unresolved Problems, Unrealized 
Goals, New Perspectives (paper read at American Association of Psychiatric Services for 
Children, Annual Meeting, San Francisco, (1976)). This influential paper is the work of 
two psychiatrists who earlier had the view that no harm would come from keeping the 
fact of a child's adoption secret. See ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, ch. 3. I can find 
nothing in the child development literature of the past decade arguing that any good can 
come from failing to disclose to a child the circumstances of her birth, except for an 
article by one psychoanalyst. On the basis of limited clinical experience, Wieder conjec-
tures that for some adoptees, the psychological disturbances that result from knowing 
that they were adopted may prove too difficult to handle; see Wieder, On Being Told of 
Adoption, 46 PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY 1 (1977). 
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sure be "enforced" and its character prescribed? Surely not. 
Deference to parental autonomy and faith in parental good 
sense remain preferable to having the state send children a cer-
tificate of IVF conception on their eighteenth birthdays. Doctors 
could make a promise to disclose a condition of the parents' re-
ceiving IVF treatment, but would there be a follow-up? And 
what sanctions could be imposed for failing to disclose? The 
child's "right" to know is strong, but not so strong as to circum-
vent the decision of the child's parents about when and how to 
disclose. 201 
b. Whether to reveal non-identifying information- What 
about information concerning the medical and genetic make-up 
of those who contributed to the children's conception? The off-
spring deserve, as do the adults who raise them, all the available 
information. 202 This should include not only the information 
about the donor of sperm, egg, embryo, or baby at the time of 
conception, but also up-dated accounts throughout the donor's 
life. The parents are themselves likely to encourage their child's 
genealogical curiosity. After all, it was their own desire to be ge-
netically linked to their offspring that led to their efforts to con-
ceive through some combination of their own and third party 
genetic materials. But as the experience over the past several 
decades with AID reveals, the relevant information is all too 
rarely available. Without a state-imposed requirement that ge-
netic and medical profiles of sperm, egg, embryo, and baby do-
nors be made initially, and then periodically up-dated and made 
available to the legal parents or to the children upon attaining 
age eighteen, such procedures may never become routine. 203 In 
201. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 198, suggest that counseling services be provided 
for parents of adoptive children who desire assistance in planning how to tell their chil-
, dren about the circumstances of their birth and adoption. Such counseling might also be 
a useful adjunct to IVF, ET, and surrogacy services, but the state should not get into the 
business of monitoring the intimate details of the parent-child relationship. 
202. My reading of the "search for roots" literature on adoptees, including ADOPTION 
TRIANGLE, supra note 99, CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 99, and many of the articles they 
cite, suggests that the genealogical bewilderment discussed here may be eased for many 
children by simply sharing with them whatever is known about their biological parents, 
short of identifiying information. It is not so much a question of whether the adoptees 
would like more than non-identifying information, but whether any psychological stress 
they experience as a consequence of not having identifying information can be at least 
partially reduced by the disclosure of non-identifying information. · 
203. Curie-Cohen, supra note 24. This study of AID procedures revealed a shocking 
lack of attention to pre-insemination screening as well as to maintaining up-dated infor-
mation about sperm donors. The AID experience, then, is far from encouraging about the 
ability of the private market to see to it that such records are maintained. Even among 
the 25 states that have AID legislation, few require recordkeeping. As a consequence, the 
choice has been made for an entire generation of AID children: no information about 
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addition to the parents' and children's legitimate interest in 
having access to non-identifying medical and genetic informa-
tion, society also has a general interest in monitoring the inci-
dence of heritable and genetic diseases and conditions. The 
medical professionals who are now devising standard protocols 
for IVF and ET acknowledge the importance of acquiring and 
maintaining complete background information about donors.20" 
A statutory requirement should bolster this resolve. As an inno-
cent participant in her own conception, the child should not be 
burdened in the future by the discovery that her perfectly legiti-
mate curiosity about the characteristics of her biological fore-
bears cannot be satisfied because records of those characteristics 
were not maintained. 
Providing non-identifying information, the wisdom of which is 
at last becoming self-evident, does not resolve the more contro-
versial question of whether to divulge the identity of a third 
party donor. Parents may be quite willing to have the donor's 
genetic profile and medical history known to their child, yet pre-
fer that the donor's identity remain undisclosed. The parents' 
feelings may depend on whether they themselves know the do-
nor's identity. These feelings may also depend on whether they 
fear that providing such knowledge to their child would threaten 
their own relationship with him or her. Our recent experience 
with the open-records debate in the context of traditional adop-
tion shows how difficult is the question of whether to disclose · 
the identity of third parties to the child's conception.20~ It may 
be possible, however, to approach an answer if we begin with the 
simpler of the noncoital situations-IVF, ET, and AID-and 
subsequently move to the more complicated circumstances of 
surrogacy. 
c. Whether to reveal the identity of IVF, ET, and AID do-
nors- Until the child is eighteen, the decision concerning the 
identity of the IVF, ET, or AID donor should be left to the 
child's parents. But once the child is herself an adult, the inter-
ests of her legal parents should no longer be able to stand in the 
way of her learning what is known about the genetic and medi-
their genetic fathers. 
204. Buster interview, supra note 29, Lamb discussions, supra note 25, AFS STATE-
MENT, supra note 91. For similar recommendations in the context of traditional adop-
tions, see CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 198, at 4.26. 
205. See generally ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99, and CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra 
note 194. In my view, because of the limited and self-selected nature of the research 
samples, none of the studies is as conclusive about the psychological benefits of disclos-
ure as many of the researchers would like us to believe. 
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cal histories of those who contributed to her conception. Nor 
should her parents' wishes stand in the way of her learning the 
identity of those contributors if she desires to do so. Even as an 
adult, however, she may encounter other legitimate barriers to 
her desire to obtain identifying information. The most formida-
ble of these are the past assurances given to sperm, egg, embryo, 
or baby donors that their anonymity would be preserved. The 
donor's reliance interest in continued anonymity cannot be 
brushed aside easily. But it can be reassessed through some kind 
of registry process206 in which donors are contacted by neutral 
intermediaries on behalf of the IVF, ET, or surrogate gestator's 
adult child, and asked if they would object to the disclosure of 
their identity. 207 
As a matter of general policy, is it advisable to establish a pre-
sumption that the identity of the donor shall eventually be made 
known to the child? The answer determines whether doctors 
performing IVF, ET, or AID should seek donors who are willing 
to have their identities disclosed. If the law tilts toward the view 
that the child has an absolute "existential right" to such disclo-
sure, or even that the child has some legitimate interest in such 
disclosure, then doctors should indeed seek donors who will not 
ask for anonymity. If, however, the law's preferred policy is as-
suring the continued availability of noncoital reproduction-a 
circumstance that might become less likely if promises of non-
disclosure were no longer offered-then the law ought to move 
cautiously in deciding to discontinue any guarantee of anonym-
ity. Sperm donors are not routinely asked if they want such a 
guarantee. They are invariably given one on the assumption that 
they would demand one if asked. 208 We have had too little expe-
rience with egg donors to predict their feelings about anonym-
ity.209 As I argued above, it is advisable to assure donors that 
they will never have any financial or legal liability for a child 
produced from their eggs or sperm.210 But the prohibition of lia-
206. See supra note 62. Upon attaining her majority, the child may communicate 
with the surrogate gestator or egg, embryo, or sperm donor and ask if the donor is willing 
to change his or her original desire for anonymity. 
207. Although, as the above discussion indicates, we are beginning to get studies of 
the effects of non-disclosure on adoptees, no one has studied the psychological effects of 
being told "no" in response to a request for identifying information made 18 years or 
more after the child's birth. 
208. Curie-Cohen, supra note 24. 
209. Dr. Buster does have anecdotal evidence that some potential donors said they 
would prefer not to have their identities disclosed, but others said they would be curious 
about any child produced from their genetic contribution and assumed that such child 
would be curious about them. Buster interview, supra note 29. 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 121-28. 
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bility differs from the assurance of anonymity. 
Because our thinking about the disclosure of the donor's iden-
tity has been so bound up with ideas about the disclosure of the 
identity of the biological parents of adopted children, it is essen-
tial to attend to a basic difference between the two kinds of non-
rearing parents. The difference gains importance in the present 
context because it strengthens the argument for a presumption 
against disclosure of the identity of sperm, egg, or embryo do-
nors. 211 The donor assists in a planned, much-desired pregnancy; 
he or she is not shedding an unwanted child. Thus, the child 
conceived in part with the assistance of a donor's genetic mate-
rial can be told that she was very much desired by all parties to 
her conception. She was not an "accident" or a "mistake." The 
donor stands in a very different relation to the child than does 
the biological parent to the adoptive child: the donor's contribu-
tion is impersonal, indeed mechanical. Donors facilitate the ges-
tational, birthing, and rearing experiences of others. The donor 
is less akin to a biological parent in an adoptive relationship 
than to a contributor of blood to a needed and wanted transfu-
sion. Hence the donor does not present, for the child, the poten-
tial problems presented for an adopted child by having an un-
known, biological parent. 
Nonetheless, recent research has begun to raise some basic 
questions about the appropriateness of assuring sperm, egg, or 
embryo donors that their identities will remain confidential. 
Nearly all of a large group of sperm donors interviewed ten to 
twenty-five years after their donations212 indicate that they are 
curious about their genetic offspring, have felt some regret about 
their earlier requests for anonymity, and are concerned about 
the possibility that the children may experience psychological 
distress as a consequence of being unable to have any contact 
with their genetic father's families. 213 The parents who raise AID 
211. For an argument in favor of the reverse presumption when full surrogate gesta-
tion is involved, see infra text accompanying notes 218-19. 
212. The questionnaires were administered by Pannor and Baran, two of the authors 
of ADOPTION TRIANGLE, supra note 99. Their research will be reported in a forthcoming 
book by Pannor and Baran, both psychiatric social workers affiliated with Vista Del Mar 
Child Care Services in Los Angeles, California. The information presented here is based 
on a telephone interview with Mr. Pannor, Apr. 9, 1985 [hereinafter cited as Pannor 
interview]. 
213. Pannor interview, supra note 212. Some anecdotal support for the Pannor and 
Baran research appeared in a television interview of male sperm donors whose sperm has 
been used to inseminate unmarried women at an Oakland, California sperm bank. These 
men spoke of their own surprise at discovering, years after their donation, that they were 
persistently troubled by a desire to know more about the children they helped produce, 
Newscenter 4, (K.R.O.N. T.V., NBC Network Affiliate), San Francisco, California, Apr. 
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children report considerable tension within their families, espe-
cially in the event of a divorce, over the issue of discussing with 
their child the nature of his or her conception. The offspring, 
most of whom are eighteen and older, report strong desires to 
know the identity of their genetic fathers. These children are not 
impressed by the argument set forth above,214 that the special 
circumstances under which the sperm was contributed result in 
their experiencing less urgency to know their actual genetic fa-
ther. These AID children believe that their relationships with 
the parents who raised them would be considerably improved if 
they were able to learn the identity of the sperm donors. 
But are these findings, based on a limited number of AID do-
nors and offspring, sufficient to overcome the arguments for pre-
serving the anonymity of sperm and egg donors? Probably not. 
The evidence from traditional adoptions is mixed; it is far from 
clear that psychological distress always follows from lack of 
knowledge about the identity of a biological parent;2111 nor is it 
clear that the only or best way to relieve that distress is by di-
vulging the parent's identity. It may be that disclosing the iden-
tity of the birth parents-the proposed "cure"-creates addi-
tional problems for the children, in relating to both their 
adoptive and biological families, that will prove just as intracta-
ble as the initial psychological distress of not knowing who the 
birth parents are. 216 Perhaps counseling or other efforts directed 
at alleviating the children's felt distress, or at enabling adoptive 
parents to understand and respond to the concerns of their chil-
dren, would be of equal or greater value. The limited research to 
date on the children of divorced parents offers even less direct 
support for a presumption favoring disclosure. The finding that 
the children of divorce do better psychologically when they 
2, 1985. 
214. Pannor interview, supra note 212. These children are, of course, not the only 
children whose fathers are perpetually "absent" or unknown. It will take some time 
before the significance of any other research on the psychological role played in a child's 
life by unknown fathers is assessed in relation to the findings of Pannor and Baran. 
215. See, e.g., the strong dissent from the argument of AnoPTION TRIANGLE, supra 
note 99, in Aumend & Barrett, Self-Concept and Attitudes Toward Adoption: A Com-
parison of Searching and Nonsearching Adult Adoptees, 63 CHILD WELFARE 251 (1984). 
Although working with a small sample, these researchers find that the desire for knowl-
edge of birth parents is not especially widespread and that the effects on self-esteem and 
identity conflicts among those adoptees who learn the identity of birth parents is not 
substantial; cf. CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 194, at 224, whose authors found wide-
spread genealogical curiosity but much less prevalent searching behavior than they had 
anticipated. 
216. See, e.g., the note of caution in Dukette, supra note 198. 
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maintain contact with both parents217 appears superficially con-
sistent with an argument that knowledge of genetic parentage is 
essential for children. But the post-divorce research explores the 
arguments for continuing an established and existing personal 
relationship, one that may not always have been happy, but one 
that has involved continuous emotional interaction. These re-
search results may not be pertinent to the question of whether 
to facilitate the creation of a personal relationship when the only 
prior link between a donor and the offspring was an impersonal, 
genetic one. 
The AID, adoption, and post-divorce research does not pre-
sent a compelling argument for disclosure; nor does it present a 
compelling case for anonymity. I would err on the side of facili-
tating the possibility of disclosure in the event that the felt need 
for such information does in fact become more widespread, and 
in the event that future research substantiates the still tentative 
claim that disclosure makes a positive difference for AID, IVF, 
or ET children. At the very least, the states should create a reg-
istry procedure to preserve the opportunity of the child, once he 
or she reaches the age of eighteen, to initiate an inquiry. At this 
point the issue is between the gene donor and the offspring, not 
between the intended parenting couple and the child. 
d. Whether to reveal the identity of surrogate gestators- I 
have been addressing the problem of disclosure as it applies to 
IVF, ET, and AID; it takes on a different texture in the context 
of full surrogacy. The genetic and gestational mother has had a 
relationship with the child that the donor of eggs, sperm, or fer-
tilized embryos has not had. Instead of an exclusively genetic 
connection, hers has included sustaining the unborn fetus within 
her uterine environment for nine months218 and may also have 
included some time caring for the child after birth. The years 
the child will spend with her rearing parents are of much more 
importance to the child's overall social and psychological devel-
opment than these nine months, but we should not therefore 
deny the importance to the child of having access not merely to 
information about, but to the actual identity of, her birth 
mother. Traditional arguments developed in the standard adop-
217. See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980); Heth-
erington, Cox & Cox, The Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADI-
TIONAL FAMILIES 233 (M, Lamb ed. 1982). 
218. For a discussion of the possibility of emotional bonding between a mother and 
an infant during the course of pregnancy itself, see KLAUS & KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT 
BONDING: THE IMPACT OF EARLY SEPARATION OR Loss ON FAMILY DEVELOPMENT 45-46 
(1976). 
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tion context for protecting the anonymity of the birth mother do 
not apply: the birth mother does not need anonymity to protect 
her against the shame or embarrassment of an unwanted preg-
nancy. The surrogate deliberately chooses to become pregnant 
and to bear a child for others. She is likely to be proud of what 
she has done. Even if she later has regrets, her stake in confiden-
tiality is not sufficient to outweigh what may be the importance 
to the child's psychological well-being of learning her identity. 
This is especially so if the birth mother receives no assurance of 
permanent anonymity in the first place and therefore, in con-
trast to birth mothers in traditional adoptions, has no reliance 
interest to protect. Nor is anonymity needed to protect the child 
against the stigma of illegitimacy. If the contract is performed, 
the child will not be illegitimate and will suffer no legal or social 
stigmas as a consequence of the circumstances of her birth. The 
one traditional argument for anonymity that continues to have 
some viability in the context of surrogacy is the need to protect 
the autonomy of the legal parents to raise the child as they pre~ 
fer without any interference by the birth mother. This interest 
can be served by insuring that the legal parents retain the right 
to decide whether to divulge the identity of the surrogate to the 
child until the child becomes an adult and can decide for herself 
whether or not to seek this information. 
Should the decision about whether and when to disclose the 
identity of the birth mother to the child be left exclusively to 
the terms of the private agreement between the surrogate ges-
tator and the child's intended parents? Not altogether. If the 
parties agree to disclosure, their agreement should be enforced. 
If they attempt instead to grant permanent anonymity to the 
surrogate, they ought to be told that such a guarantee cannot be 
made. As with sperm, egg, or embryo donors, states should es-
tablish a registry procedure to enable the question of disclosure 
to be raised between the child and the birth mother at some 
later point in the child's life. 219 
I have been arguing that the potential psychological harm to 
children resulting from not having complete information about 
those who contributed to their creation warrants specific legal 
procedures to facilitate access to such information. But I remain 
unpersuaded by arguments for mandatory disclosures of the 
219. My intuitive sense is that the number of women willing to serve as surrogates 
would not decrease if potential surrogates were told that even if they preferred anonym-
ity, the state might determine that the welfare of the child required leaving open the 
possibility of disclosing their identity at some future date. 
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identities of surrogate gestators or the donors of genetic mate-
rial. Consider how many children raised by their genetic parents 
may not be told every detail of their parents' background. Par-
ents may choose to omit some information about their own lives 
or about the lives of close relatives. Most people grow up with 
knowledge about themselves and their families that is incom-
plete or distorted. No public authority exists ready to dissemi-
nate to the child-turned-adult his or her own Book of Geneal-
ogy. The alleged severity and persistence of psychological 
distress and of intra-family conflicts resulting from such incom-
plete knowledge remains elusive and speculative, despite the re-
search findings discussed above. I believe, however, that the his-
tory of traditional adoptions teaches us that we should not 
attempt to irrevocably impose secrecy, and that the psychologi-
cal, social, and financial advantages to children of being reared 
by adoptive parents can be attained without inflexible policies 
on confidentiality. As we attempt to shape the law to provide for 
the welfare of the offspring of noncoital reproduction, we should 
at least preserve, rather than foreclose, options. Although the 
jury will of necessity be out for an indefinite time on the ques-
tion of potential harm to the offspring, we do not have to be 
paralyzed, unable to take steps to minimize or avoid the harms 
that might occur. The state should act even though we may 
never know in our own lifetimes whether these alleged harms 
would in fact have occurred if we had not acted to forestall 
them. The state should make available to the offspring of IVF, 
ET, AID, or surrogacy certain procedures whereby they may 
learn no less than the rest of us ever learn about our forebears. 
But there should be no obligation to see to it that they learn 
more. 
3. A different kind of harm to children- The offspring of 
noncoital reproduction are not the only children who are placed 
at risk by the striving of men and women for procreative auton-
omy. There remains an altogether different category of potential 
harm: the risk of indifference to the many thousands of children, 
indeed, to the hundreds of thousands,220 who are already born 
but in desperate need of parents to raise them. Those who pur-
sue IVF, ET, AID, or surrogacy do so in part because of the be-
lief that they have no reasonable alternatives for obtaining a 
220. The Children's Defense Fund estimated in 1978 that 500,000 American children, 
many of them infants but most of them pre-adolescents and adolescents, were without 
permanent homes and were being raised in foster homes or in some kind of institutional 
setting. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 1-2 (1978). 
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child; that, for example, there are not enough infants available 
for adoption. 221 While it is certainly true that most adoption 
agencies do not have healthy white infants222 to off er to the 
childless,223 it is not true that a supply of adoptable children is 
generally lacking. Aside from older children with mental or 
physical handicaps, who indeed may pose special problems for 
prospective parents, many thousands of healthy white and non-
white American as well as foreign-born chidren remain, who 
would probably do quite well even if raised by parents of a dif-
ferent racial or ethnic background. 224 Many more women and 
adolescents than is commonly supposed, who give birth out of 
wedlock, would consider relinquishing their children for adop-
tion if they were treated in a more humane and sensitive manner 
than has been characteristic of many adoption agencies in the 
past. 2211 These mothers want to be reimbursed for their preg-
nancy-related expenses and they want to have some role in the 
221. The only published survey, to date, of the characteristics and attitudes of 
couples applying for IVF treatment indicates that more than two-thirds of the 200 
couples interviewed were positive or neutral toward adoption. About one-third would 
continue to consider adoption or fostering if their IVF efforts were unsuccessful. Free-
man, Boxer, Rickels, Tureck & Mastroianni, Psychological Evaluation and Support in a 
Program of in Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 48 
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Freeman] (describing a study of 200 couples applying for IVF 
treatment at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital between Jan. 1983 and Mar. 1984). 
Anecdotal evidence from couples pursuing surrogacy also suggests that many of these 
couples would have adopted an infant if one had been available. See, e.g., KEANE & 
BREO, supra note 32, at ch. 1. 
222. Nearly all the couples seeking IVF or ET are white. Freeman, supra note 222 
(96'.',, of couples applying to University of Pennsylvania IVF Clinic are white); Lamb 
discussions, supra note 25; Buster interview, supra note 29. 
223. In the 1970's, agency placements fell from about 70,000 per year to less than 
25,000. Wadlington, supra note 23, at 467. National data on adoptive placements has not 
been available since 1971. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 198, at 6. No one doubts, how-
ever, that adoption agencies have been placing very few newborns and that the average 
wait for an adoptable infant from an agency is 5 to 7 years. Interview with David Keene 
Leavitt, member Adoption Committee, A.B.A. Family Law Section, and Adoption Com-
mittee of California State Bar, Apr. 11, 1985 [hereinafter cited as Leavitt interview]. 
224. CHOSEN CHILDREN, supra note 194, at 4-6, for an account of the special difficul-
ties, and distinctive successes, of transracial and transcultural adoptions. Additional sub-
stantiation of the claim that "whatever problems may be generated by transracial adop-
tion, the benefits to the child outweigh the costs," is reported in the follow-up study to 
CHOSEN CHILDREN, Feigelman & Silverman, The Long-Term Effects of Transracial 
Adoption, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 588, 600-01 (1984); this article contains a useful bibliogra-
phy, at 601-02, for exploring some of the controversial aspects of transracial adoptions. 
The National Association of Black Social Workers remains opposed to transracial adop-
tion, as do other black professional organizations, on the ground that "Black children in 
white families are cut off from a healthy development of themselves as Black people," 
quoted in R.J. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 45 (1977). 
225. MEEZAN, supra note 9, at 228-32; Charney, supra note 99; Leavitt interview, 
supra note 223. 
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selection of the adoptive parents for their child. 
In addition to the many adults eager for children to raise, 
there are, then, many children who need parents. What we lack 
is a sustained public commitment to bringing the two together. 
The state's interest in assuring all children an opportunity to 
have parents, which I have argued deserves more fundamental 
protection than the interests of adults in procreating,226 calls for 
more legislative and financial efforts to avoid the harms noted 
here. 227 Without such a commitment, the worlds of adoption and 
of noncoital reproduction will grow farther and farther apart, 
and those who resort to the laboratory to conceive a child will be 
symbolically, if not actually, diminishing the role of adoption in 
our society. 
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH AND 
SERVICES 
In exploring this new chapter in the striving of women and 
men for full procreative autonomy,228 I have shown how modern 
medical technology has created choices where previously none 
had existed, and have argued that actors in the new reproduc-
tive drama deserve from the law certain supports that are now 
insufficiently in place. I have sought to specify these supports, 
and to distinguish what they can and cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to achieve on behalf of the various parties affected by 
noncoital reproduction. It remains to underscore the extent to 
which this historic drama is being played out on a stage 
designed and managed by professionals whose relation to the 
public interest constitutes an enduring controversy in our soci-
ety. If Jehovah sought to manage, in a fashion, the drama cen-
tering around Ishmael, today's Ishmaels and Hagars, and Sarahs 
and Abrahams, must rely instead on doctors and lawyers respon-
sive both to the dynamics of their own professions and to the 
competitive and commercial aspects of the private market for 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60 and 80-83. 
227. Adoption or "permanency planning" is, of course, not the only, and not always 
the best response to the plight of homeless children. In my view, efforts should first be 
directed at sustaining a viable existence for the child within the context of his or her 
biological family. See generally K. KENISTON, ALL Ou& CHILDREN ch. 9 (1977); Davis, 
supra note 98; Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423 (1983). 
Nonetheless, the contemporary focus on the rights of birth parents and on the potential 
of IVF, ET, or surrogacy for obtaining biologically-related offspring may serve to obscure 
the benefits of adoption for both children and adults. 
228. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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baby-making. 229 
This reliance calls for further scrutiny and reflection in at 
least two areas. The first involves the circumstances surrounding 
research on the efficacy, safety, and long term psychosocial and 
physical consequences of noncoital repro,duction. The second in-
volves the competence and accountability of those who provide 
IVF, ET, or surrogacy services. A basic question must be raised 
about both areas: to what extent can the law encourage greater 
responsiveness by the private providers to the interests of the 
childless and their hoped-for offspring? All I can do here is to 
indicate why this question is so difficult to answer. 
In marked contrast to the substantial federal funding for most 
other biomedical research in this country, funds for basic and 
applied research in noncoital reproduction still derive entirely 
from private sources.230 In addition to relatively small sums from 
nonprofit medical centers and foundations, support comes from 
venture capital companies231 and perhaps even from a portion of 
the fees paid by childless patients. 232 Privately funded research 
may yield useful practical results, but it is scarcely reasonable to 
expect research carried out under the auspices of profit-con-
scious venture capitalists to be directed toward reducing patient 
fees or toward advancing our understanding of underlying physi-
ological and genetic processes. If the moratorium on federal 
229. Perhaps the most comprehensive history and analysis of the emergence of a cor-
porate ethos in the medical profession is in P. STARR, THE Soc1AL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). No comparable contemporary analysis exists for the legal 
profession, although Willard Hurst's work still provides a fascinating introduction to this 
subject, W. Hurst, The Bar, in THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950); there is at least 
one excellent recent case study, in J.P. HEINZ & E.O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). 
230. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also, Pear, Grants for Medical 
Research to be Cut by Administration, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985 at Al, col. 2. NIH 
funds may be used to support research on some of the psychosocial consequences of 
noncoital reproduction. See, e.g., the results of an NIH-funded project reported in Mc-
Guire & Alexander, supra note 94. But because of the moratorium in effect since the late 
1970's on federal funding of IVF and ET, NIH funds are not available for basic research 
on the efficacy or safety of IVF and ET techniques or for studying externally fertilized 
embryos for information about the structure of genes, the development of malignancies, 
the "natural" loss of embryos, etc. 
231. For example, the work on donor embryo transfers by Dr. John Buster and other 
researchers at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center was funded by a $500,000 grant from Fer-
tility & Genetics Research, Inc., a Chicago-based venture capital firm, supra notes 29-30 
and accompanying text. Medical research and health care are among the "new hot spots 
for venture capital investing," according to Eckhouse, Plight of Venture Capitalists, S.F. 
Chronicle, Feb. 1, 1985, at 33. 
232. I have not found any direct evidence that patient fees are being used to subsi-
dize research on IVF or ET procedures, but the suggestion that they are is not implausi-
ble. See Abramowitz, supra note 6, at 9. 
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funding were lifted, the prospects might improve for creating 
both a more broadly defined agenda for research and a more 
neutral and comprehensive system for evaluating and dissemi-
nating its results.233 The introduction of federal guidelines might 
inspire greater confidence among the childless when certain pro-
cedures are designated as "acceptable treatments" and others as 
"merely experimental." It might also assure that participants in 
genuine research projects were neither paid to "volunteer" nor 
expected to pay for any services rendered to them. 234 
It would be naive to expect, however, that any transition to 
increased public support for research would guarantee that com-
mercial principles would give way to those of "disinterested" sci-
entific inquiry. Federal funding or monitoring would no doubt 
be accompanied by political, ethical, and cultural conflicts about 
the appropriateness of specific research endeavors. Approval for 
research proposals would be sought amid public debates about 
the definition of "life," the consequences of experimentation on 
human embryos, the use of donated genetic materials, the dispo-
sition of unused embryos, and the appropriateness of allowing 
unmarried persons to be among the potential beneficiaries of 
noncoital reproduction. Moreover, a shift to federal funding 
would raise the question of research priorities. Is noncoital re-
production so important a need in our society that federal funds 
should be allocated to its development rather than, for example, 
to research on the causes of infertility, or on how to prevent the 
ravages of sexually transmitted diseases,235 or on how to reduce 
the infant mortality rate? 236 Finally, regardless of what combina-
tion of private and public funds eventually prevails,237 the find-
233. These points were among those made before Representative Albert Gore's Sub-
committee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, 
United States House of Representatives, Aug. 8, 1984, cited in Annas, Redefining 
Parenthood and Protecting Embryos, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 5, 1984, at 50. 
234. For a discussion of federal requirements that human subjects in federally spon-
sored research projects not be offered any "undue" inducements to participate, see 
Schwartz, Institutional Review of Medical Research, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 143, 148 (1983). 
235. See, e.g., the pleas of Leon.Kass that federal funds should be spent on preven-
tive measures rather than on what he characterizes as "our thoughtless preference for 
expensive, high-technology, therapy-oriented approaches to disease and dysfunctions." 
Kass, supra note 5, at 54; a similar plea is made, albeit from a more avowedly feminist 
perspective, in Hubbard, supra note 131. 
236. Recent data indicate not only a nationwide slowing of the rate of decline in in-
fant mortality, but also an ominous increase in some states in the mortality rate of ba-
bies after the newborn stage. Pear, "Cause for Concern" on Infant Mortality Seen by 
U.S. Agency, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1985, at Al. 
237. Any discussion of funding sources for research on noncoital reproduction must 
take account of the more general contemporary debate about the goals and methods of 
research in biotechnology. A useful introduction to this debate is the editorial, How 
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ings of research on noncoital reproduction are likely to be less 
definitive than its proponents desire238 and to require interpreta-
tion within a matrix of conflicting personal and social values. 
As for the competence and accountability of those offering 
noncoital reproductive services to the childless, the medical and 
legal professionals have a number of incentives to regulate them-
selves. Among these are concerns about malpractice liability, ea-
gerness to match, and indeed to surpass, the achievements of 
rival professional communities in Britain and Australia, and 
competition among medical schools to offer specialized training 
in reproductive endocrinology.2311 Lawyers who are in-
termediaries in surrogacy arrangements are sensitive about the 
relatively low prestige of family law practice240 and want to insu-
late themselves against allegations of "baby-selling."20 Further, 
many doctors and lawyers are genuinely committed to assuring 
safe, efficient, and humane service to their patients and clients. 
Responding to these incentives, medical groups have begun to 
devise standard protocols for IVF and ET clinicians. 242 There 
are also indications that the psychological aspects of infertility 
treatments are not being ignored. 243 
Nevertheless, wherever profit motives and professional rival-
ries are strong, we have reason to look for ways in which the law 
can supplement efforts at self-regulation. Because the capital in-
vestment needed to equip an IVF, ET, or AID-surrogate gestator 
clinic is very low (compared, for example, to the costs of equip-
ment for performing heart transplants), it is easy to enter the 
business of selling noncoital reproductive services. The public 
interest in assuring the competence of the purveyors of these 
Much Research Is Enough?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at A14, col. 1, and one of the 
many responding letters to the editor, Cape & Perpich, How We Can Stay Ahead in 
Biotechnology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at A26, col. 3. 
238. For an interesting general discussion of why "[d]iscovering what works and what 
does not is something the medical professional is not very good at," see Bunker, When 
Doctors Disagree, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 25, 1985, at 7. 
239. These concerns were frequently expressed in the Lamb discussions, supra note 
25, and in the Buster interview, supra note 29. They are also manifest in the professional 
medical journals cited throughout this article. 
240. One of the best contemporary analyses of how family law practitioners are re-
garded by other lawyers, as well as by their clients and the general public, is in HEINZ & 
LAUMANN, supra note 229, at Part III. 
241. See generally Handel, supra note 22; Keane & Breo, supra note 32; Sherwyn, 
supra note 87. 
242. See, e.g., AFS Statement, supra note 91, and the influential article, Dandekar & 
Quigley, Laboratory Set Up for Human in Vitro Fertilization, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
1 (1984). 
243. See, e.g., Mahlstadt, The Psychosocial Component of Infertility, 43 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 335 (1985); Freeman, supra note 221. 
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services might, therefore, be well-served by the imposition of 
some statutory licensing requirements.244 But the government 
should not indirectly support the creation of private monopoly 
control over entry into the market by granting patent protection 
to specific noncoital reproductive techniques.245 Beyond that, it 
is easier to identify the appropriate limits to federal regulation 
than it is to outline a program for exactly how a combination of 
private and public regulation can best guarantee services of the 
highest possible quality. And the law can probably do even less 
to ensure that the childless actually exercise their procreative 
choices to achieve their own goals-not the goals of the doctors 
and lawyers upon whom they must depend. 246 
In our search for ways to reap the benefits and to resolve the 
problems raised by the new reproductive technologies, a certain 
skepticism about "hypergenetic" activity is in order. We would 
do well to remember the power of society and culture to transfer 
and to transform what we are from one generation to the next. 
Control of our genes does not, after all, provide us with very 
much control over the kinds of people who will carry these 
genes. Genes are of course relevant, but we achieve our most in-
timate and abiding identities as the children of the parents who 
raise us. As we enlist the support of the law in behalf of procrea-
tive autonomy, we should not forget that the reproduction of self 
that so many hope to achieve through their children is more evi-
dent in the long term relationships of rearing and nurturance 
than in the single act of genetic procreation. 
244. I have in mind something similar to the statutory licensing authority recom-
mended in Britain by the WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 14. Unlike the Warnock recom-
mendation, however, such licensing would not be denied to those offering surrogacy 
services. 
245. A sharp controversy has erupted within the medical profession about the propri-
ety of the application of Fertility & Genetics Research, Inc., supra note 231, for patent 
protection for the donor embryo transfer procedure developed by Dr. Buster and his 
colleagues with investment funds from Fertility & Genetics Research, Inc. Although pat-
ent protection for drugs and medical devices is commonplace, such protection for a med-
ical process is virtually unprecedented and, if enforceable, would enable the patent 
holder to exercise considerable control over who could or could not perform the pro-
tected medical procudures. See Annas, supra note 30, and Chapman, supra note 90. 
246. An excellent analysis of how authoritarian patterns of interaction continue to 
define most doctor-patient relationships can be found in J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF 
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
